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USE OF FOREIGN STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
IN ILLINOIS: AN ANALYSIS OF
STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL TECHNIQUE
Jane Hoffman Locke*
INTRODUCTION
Kathy Keeton, a New York resident, filed suit for libel and invasion of
privacy against Hustler Magazine, Inc. in Ohio, where Hustler's headquarters
are located. The Ohio court dismissed the libel claim as barred by the Ohio
statute of limitations, and the privacy claim as barred by the New York
statute of limitations.'
Apparently undaunted by the setback, Ms. Keeton located the only state
which had an unexpired statute of limitations for libel, New Hampshire.
Fortunately for Ms. Keeton, Hustler sold 10 to 15,000 copies of its magazine
in New Hampshire each month and possibly was subject to its jurisdiction
on that basis even though the parties had no other contacts with the state.
2
Ms. Keeton promptly filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of New Hampshire.
The New Hampshire district court and the First Circuit held that it would
be unfair to subject Hustler to New Hampshire jurisdiction because of the
plaintiff's obvious forum shopping.' The First Circuit concluded that "the
New Hampshire tail is too small to wag so large an out-of-state dog." 4
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions in Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc.5 The Court admonished the lower courts that poten-
tial unfairness to the defendant Hustler from the use of New Hampshire's
statute of limitations was unrelated to New Hampshire's jurisdiction to
adjudicate the claim. According to the Court, any unfairness that might
arise by applying the New Hampshire statute must be dealt with as a separate
choice-of-law issue. 6
While many scholarly articles will dissect the jurisdictional holding of
Keeton, its choice of law aspects will receive scant attention. The choice of
law implications of Keeton, however, are significant. The Supreme Court
repeatedly has refused to consider a plaintiff's choice-of-law forum shopping
as a limit on permissible assertion of jurisdictional power;7 this position was
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law. B.A., M.A,
University of Michigan; J.D., Cornell University.
1. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 n.l (1984).
2. Id. at 1477.
3. Keeton, 682 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1982).
4. Id. at 36.
5. 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (1984).
6. Id. at 1480.
7. See, e.g., Kulko v. California Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958).
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reaffirmed in Keeton. The Court's refusal to relate choice of law to the
permissible limits of jurisdiction encourages plaintiffs to forum shop for
favorable law. Because courts routinely apply their own statutes of limitations
to out-of-state claims, plaintiffs frequently forum shop for an unexpired
statute of limitations-a practice implicitly endorsed by the jurisdictional
holding in Keeton. Unfortunately, the Keeton Court did not address the
question of whether the use of the New Hampshire limitations period was
constitutional as a separate choice of law matter because that issue was not
before the Court. Although the Court suggested that such a routine appli-
cation of a forum's statute of limitations to a case with minimal connection
to the forum was troublesome and perhaps unconstitutional, the Court is
not likely to resolve this issue in the near future.'
How would Kathy Keeton have fared in an Illinois forum? Illinois has a
Borrowing Statute9 that employs a foreign statute of limitations to bar out-
of-state claims. The intended purpose of the Borrowing Statute is to prevent
forum shopping. Although by its terms, and given its purpose, it should bar
a case like Keeton, recent judicial narrowing of the Borrowing Statute's
application raises doubts as to whether it would apply. 0
8. 104 S. Ct. at 1480 n.10. The Court stated:
There has been considerable academic criticism of the rule that permits a forum State
to apply its own statute of limitations regardless of the significance of contacts
between the forum State and the litigation .... But we find it unnecessary to express
an opinion at this time as to whether any arguable unfairness rises to the level of a
due process violation.
Id. (citations omitted).
9. Code of Civil Procedure § 13-210, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-210 (1983). See generally
Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 33 (1962)
(expressing dissatisfaction with current status of borrowing statutes); Vernon, Statutes of
Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 287 (1960)
(discussing two extensive surveys regarding borrowing statutes). For analysis of the borrowing
statutes of other states, see Grossman, Statutes of Limitation and the Conflict of Laws: Modern
Analysis, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 14 n.Sl (1980) (legislatures have responded to traditional charac-
terization of statutes of limitations as procedural by enacting borrowing statutes); Nordstrom,
Ohio's Borrowing Statute of Limitations-A Quaking Quagmire in a Dismal Swamp, 16 OHIO
ST. L.J. 183 (1955) (discussion of Ohio Borrowing Statute); Siegel, Conflicts of Laws, 19
SYRACUSE L. REV. 235 (1968) (analysis of New York Borrowing Statute in context of choice of
laws); Comment, Choice of Law and the New York Borrowing Statute: A Conflict of Rationales,
35 ALB. L. REV. 754 (1971) (discussion of New York Borrowing Statute); Comment, The Impact
of Significant Contacts on the Pennsylvania Borrowing Statute, 72 DICK. L. REV. 598 (1968)
(analysis of Pennsylvania Borrowing Statute within the context of conflict of laws).
Borrowing statutes are by no means uniform. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW
§ 128, 257 (3d ed. 1977). A 1960 survey of the thirty-eight states with borrowing statutes
classified those statutes in 17 separate categories. Vernon, supra, at 294-97. Some states limit
application of the statute to cases involving only non-resident parties or non-resident plaintiffs;
others bar a claim if it is barred by the law of any jurisdiction in which one, or sometimes
both, the parties resided. Still other statutes are limited to certain categories of cases such as
contracts, personal injury, or non-real property actions. There are numerous additional varia-
tions. See id.
10. See infra notes 22-24, 30-31, 39 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 34:409
1985] STA TUTES OF LIMITATIONS 411
This article analyzes the development of Illinois law regarding the selection
of a statute of limitations for a conflicts case with multistate contacts. The
analysis focuses principally on the use of the Borrowing Statute and its
emergence as an obstacle to the modernization of Illinois limitations law. In
addition, the article will analyze the use of foreign statutes of limitations in
cases not subject to the Borrowing Statute.
BACKGROUND-THE PURPOSE OF THE BORROWING STATUTE
Illinois enacted its Borrowing Statute in the late nineteenth century and
has never amended it. The statute provides that:
When a cause of action has arisen in a state or territory out of this
state, or in a foreign country, and by the laws thereof, an action
thereon cannot be maintained by reason of the lapse of time, an
action thereon shall not be maintained in this state."
The statute prescribes the use of another state's statute of limitations when
the court determines that the cause of action has "arisen" in that state. 2
The sole function of the statute is to bar suits which otherwise might be
maintained under an unexpired Illinois statute of limitations. The Borrowing
Statute does not enable the court to select an unexpired foreign statute of
limitations in lieu of an expired Illinois limitations period. 4
11. Code of Civil Procedure § 13-320, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-210 (1983).
12. See Speight v. Miller, 437 F.2d 781, 783 n.4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 827
(1971). The statute of limitations is borrowed with "all its accouterments," the tolling provisions
of the foreign state, and perhaps its borrowing statute as well.
13. Generally, statutes of limitations vary according to the type of claim brought, and even
among identical claims the length of the statutes may differ from state to state. To illustrate,
in Illinois oral contract actions must commence within five years after the cause of action has
accrued. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1983). A ten-year limitations period applies to written
contract actions. Id. ch. 110, § 13-206. Indiana, however, expands the time that a plaintiff may
bring a claim for breach of an oral contract to six years, IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-1 (Burns Supp.
1984), and breach of written contract claims, "other than those for the payment of money,"
may be maintained up to ten years after the cause of action has accrued, id. § 34-1-2-2(6).
Finally, Wisconsin provides an innovative approach towards establishing a statute of limitations
in contracts for sale. Under its statute, claims arising from breach of any contract for sale
must commence within six years. Moreover, if both parties are merchants, they may, by the
original agreement, "reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year." Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 402.725(l) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
Similar variations in statutes of limitations exist among the states with respect to tort claims.
For instance, in Illinois, a plaintiff bringing a product liability claim has two years to bring an
action after the date on which the plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known of the
existence of the personal injury. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-213 (1983). The Indiana statute
is virtually identical, requiring an action to commence within two years after the cause of action
accrues. IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (Burns 1975). The California statute of limitations to
file a product liability action, as well as many other tort claims, however, is one year. CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 340 (West 1973).
14. See Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170, 1175 n.4 (N.D. I1. 1969);
Bemis v. Stanley, 93 Ill. 230 (1879); Sarro v. Maupin, 127 Ill. App. 2d 26, 261 N.E.2d 756
(1st Dist. 1970); Jackson v. Shuttleworth, 42 Il1. App. 2d 257, 192 N.E.2d 217 (3d Dist. 1963);
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Unfortunately there is little legislative history pertaining to the Borrowing
Statute.'5 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, provided some insight into
the probable intention of the legislature. In Hyman v. Bayne," a case decided
shortly after passage of the statute, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that
the Borrowing Statute was intended to overcome the courts' reluctance to
use foreign statutes of limitations to bar out-of-state claims., 7 The court
viewed the adoption of the Borrowing Statute as a legislative attempt to
overrule decisions in which courts used a local statute of limitations for an
out-of-state claim and tolled the local statute for an excessive period.
The Hyman court was referring to the traditional American rules regarding
a court's selection of the proper statute of limitations when presented with
a case involving a choice of law problem. 8 Under the traditional view, courts
apply their own procedural law in such cases even though the substantive
rights of the parties may be determined under another state's law.' 9 While
Horan v. New Home Sewing Mach. Co., 289 I11. App. 340, 7 N.E.2d 401 (lst Dist. 1937);
Harden v. Whitman, 109 III. App. 106 (Ist Dist. 1917); O'Donnell v. Lewis, 104 I11. App. 198
(Ist Dist. 1902). See generally Comment, Foreign Statute of Limitations: Borrowed Only to
Shorten the Period of Limitations of the Forum, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 452, 455 (1962) (discussing
majority position that action barred by forum statute of limitations is barred regardless of fact
that claim is not barred in state where cause of action arose).
15. The only legislative history available is in the Senate Records. See 2 JOURNAL OF THE
SENATE OF THE 27TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, at 378, 513, 618, 837, 843,
870 (1871-1872) (discussing S. 398).
16. 83 Ill. 256 (1876).
17. Id. at 261.
18. A case with a choice of law question is a case that has factual connections with more
than one state or country. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff and defendant are involved
in an auto accident in the state of Illinois, but both parties are residents of the state of Indiana.
The parties' residence involves a second jurisdiction in the case, thus requiring a court to
determine whether plaintiff's right to recover is to be based on Illinois or Indiana law. A court
might select Indiana law if it believes that the parties' residence is more significant than the
situs of the accident.
19. The definition of "substance" and "procedure" has been the subject of intense discus-
sion by conflicts scholars. For a most perceptive analysis, see Cook, "Substance" and "Pro-
cedure" in the Conflicts of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933). Cook argued that the dividing line
between the two varied depending on the purpose of the classification. In conflicts cases, Cook
suggested a key judicial consideration in categorizing matters as substance or procedure is the
inconvenience to the court in applying foreign law to a particular issue. Id. at 343-44. He
suggested, for example, that the only justification for refusal to apply foreign law on burden
of proof (when other issues were to be determined under foreign law, perhaps due to a foreign
injury) would be forum inconvenience. Id. at 346. The implication of Cook's approach is that
because it is not difficult for a forum to determine and use a foreign statute of limitations,
these statutes should typically be classified as substantive and deferred to by other states. A
different approach was advocated by Ailes in Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws,
31 MICH. L. REV. 474 (1933). Ailes maintained that for statutes of limitations, the law of the
forum should be applied as a general rule on the basis of its simplicity and convenience of use.
See also Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 617, 643 (1932) (stating that "[tihe difference between procedural and substantive law
is a moveable dividing line which may be placed wherever an objective examination of our
judicial institutions indicates is necessary"); McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Proce-
dure in the Conflict of Laws, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 949 (1930) (discussion of the applicability
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the substance/procedure distinction is difficult to discern for some issues,
statutes of limitations generally have been viewed as procedural matters.2 0
As a result, the courts often mechanically apply the local statute of limitations
in a choice of law case, even though the claim arose in another state and
thus may be governed in all other respects by the law of another state. 2'
This policy can produce unusual results if the local statute of limitations is
tolled.
While the purpose of a statute of limitations is to require a plaintiff to
diligently pursue a right and afford repose to a defendant, 22 a tolling statute
of the law of the transaction versus the law of the forum); Morgan, Choice of Law Governing
Proof, 58 HARV. L. REV. 153, 195 (1944) (suggesting that the law of the locus should apply to
all substantive matters materially influencing the outcome of litigation); Morgan, Rules of
Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REV. 467, 484 (1957) (analysis of the
procedural-substantive dichotomy); Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure" Revisited with
Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of Irrebuttable Presumptions, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 189, 190 (1982) (traces the development of the procedural-substantive dichotomy and
establishes a model distinguishing the two); Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to
Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 813, 822 (1962) (stating
that "the outcome test of Erie may furnish a guide for the determination of the extent to which
[the law of the locus] should be incorporated in dealing with a conflicts problem"); Twerski &
Mayer, Toward a Pragmatic Solution of Choice-of-Law Problems-At the Interface of Sub-
stance and Procedure, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 781, 784 (1979) (breakdown of the procedural-
substantive dichotomy).
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws (First Restatement) took the inflexible and overly-
simplistic view that "[aill matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum."
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §585 (1934). It reflected the views of its principal
draftsman, Joseph Beale, who stated:
That the statute of limitations of the forum is the applicable law of limitations is so
well settled in Anglo-American law at least, as to be beyond dispute .... From the
doctrine that statutes of limitation "relate to the remedy" it logically follows that
the fact that the suit would be barred by the foreign statute if action were brought
where the right arose is no defense to the action at the forum.
J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1620-21 (1935) (citations omitted).
20. See, e.g., Hilberg v. Industrial Comm'n, 380 Ill. 102, 105, 43 N.E.2d 671, 672 (1942).
The most frequently asserted basis for this conclusion is that a limitation affects solely the
nature of the remedy to be afforded and the forum should be permitted to fashion its own
remedy even though it recognizes foreign law to determine parties' rights.
21. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Townsend, 197 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1952); Panhandle E. Pipeline
Co. v. Parish, 168 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1948); Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 407
(1849).
The consequences of the forum-rule approach are twofold. Mechanistic application of the
forum's statute of limitations invites forum shopping if plaintiff's claim is barred by expired
limitations periods in other states. Conversely, the forum may apply its own limitations period
to bar a claim that could be heard in other states. When the substantive rights of the parties
are to be determined under the law of another state, the forum's denial of a remedy may work
a substantial injustice to the plaintiff.
22. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 9, § 127, at 253; Ailes, supra note 19, at 491; Grossman,
Statutes of Limitation and the Conflict of Laws: Modern Analysis, 1 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, I1
(1980); see also Stanley v. Chastek, 34 Ill. App. 2d 220, 180 N.E.2d 512 (2d Dist. 1962)
(purpose of the statute of limitations is to serve as an affirmative defense). Multiple purposes
for statutes of limitations have been suggested: (1) fairness to defendants; (2) a desire to relieve
the courts of the burden of adjudicating frivolous or stale claims; and (3) the protection of
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operates to suspend the running of the statute of limitations in certain
situations. The rationale for tolling a statute of limitations is based upon
the recognition that not every delay in filing a lawsuit is caused by a plaintiff's
inaction. Delays may be caused by conditions beyond the plaintiff's control,
such as the defendant's evasion or the fraudulent concealment of the cause
of action. Alternatively, the delay may be caused by a plaintiff's disability.
23
Tolling statutes, however, usually are not drafted for application to cases
involving choice of law questions. Few tolling statutes provide special tolling
provisions for claims which arise out of state.2 4 If a tolling statute tolls the
forum's statute of limitations for defendants who have never been in the
state, defendants may face the prospect of perpetual tolling of a state's
statute of limitations until they enter that state. Suspension of the limitations
period may be appropriate for local claims when a defendant leaves the
state, especially in situations where the defendant has left the state to evade
service of process. When lawsuits involving out-of-state claims are filed
against non-resident defendants, however, the application of the tolling
statute is not necessarily warranted and may be unjust in many situations. 25
When the Hyman case was decided, many states used local statutes of
limitations, and tolled the statutes to preserve out-of-state claims indefinitely.
According to the court in Hyman, the Illinois Borrowing Statute was in-
tended to alleviate the plight of defendants in such actions.26
Examination of the legislative history of the Borrowing Statute in con-
junction with the Illinois law of tolling illuminates the court's statement in
Hyman. Prior to the passage of the Borrowing Statute, the Tolling Statute 27
plaintiffs. See Milhollin, Interest Analysis and Statutes of Limitations, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1
(1975); Note, Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185
(1950).
23. See Code of Civil Procedure § 13-211, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-211 (1983) (statute
tolled until minor reaches 18 years of age or until other legal disability removed).
24. See Vernon, The Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act: Tolling
Problems, 12 VAND. L. REV. 971, 980 (1959) (arguing that tolling in such circumstances is
outmoded, and unjust). But see G.D. Searle v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404 (1982) (holding that a
Tolling Statute that tolled the limitations period of an action against a foreign corporation
amenable to a state's jurisdiction but which had no person or officer within the state upon
whom process may be served did not violate the equal protection and due process clauses of
the fourteenth amendment).
25. See Vernon, supra note 24, at 980-81.
26. 83 111. at 261.
27. Code of Civil Procedure § 13-208, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-208 (Cum. Supp.
1984).
The first version of the Tolling Statute, enacted in 1845, provided as follows:
If any person or persons against whom there is or shall be any cause of action ...
except real or possessory actions shall be out of this State at the time of the cause
of action accruing, or any time during which a suit might be sustained on such cause
of action, then the person or persons who shall be entitled to such action, shall be
at liberty to bring the same against such person or persons, after his, or her or their
return to this State, and the time of such person's absence shall not be accounted or
taken as part of the time limited by this chapter.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 66, § 13 (1845) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 34:409
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did not apply to defendants who had never been present in Illinois, 2  thus
precluding tolling for out-of-state claims against non-resident defendants. In
1873, the same year the Borrowing Statute was enacted, the Tolling Statute
was amended to toll such claims. 29 The timing of these two legislative actions
suggests that the legislature realized that the use of an Illinois statute of
limitations, with no provision for tolling out-of-state claims, might unfairly
deprive a litigant of sufficient time to pursue a claim against an out-of-state
defendant in an Illinois court. The legislature apparently recognized that
such cases should be tolled in some circumstances; yet, there must be a limit
to the duration of the tolled period. The simultaneous adoption of the two
statutes suggests a legislative conclusion that the defendant's availability in
the state where the claim arose for the duration of that state's statute of
limitations should impose an outside limit on the tolling of the Illinois
limitations period. The Borrowing Statute accomplishes such a result by
applying the foreign state's expired statute of limitations, even though the
tolled Illinois statute has not expired. Put simply, a plaintiff will not be
treated more generously in Illinois than in the state where the claim arose.
Thus, the Borrowing Statute, as enacted, is a legislative decision to apply
the statute of limitations of the state where a claim arose. Such legislative
action was necessitated by the expanded application of tolling to out-of-state
claims.30 Consequently, the Borrowing Statute is a subsidiary to, and a
narrowing of, the Tolling Statute. The primary use of the Borrowing Statute
should be in cases where the Illinois statute of limitations is tolled. The
Illinois courts' subsequent use of the Borrowing Statute is consistent with
this premise. Most cases have presented the court with a choice between an
expired foreign statute and a tolled Illinois statute of limitations."
The Borrowing Statute is intended to serve an additional purpose in cases
that do not involve a tolled Illinois statute of limitations. The Borrowing
Statute mandates the selection of an expired foreign statute of limitations
for claims which arise outside of Illinois in lieu of an unexpired, but not
This statute was ambiguous in its application to a defendant who had never been in the state,
either at the time of accrual of a cause of action or any time thereafter, but prior to
commencement of the action.
28. Hyman, 83 Ill. at 263.
29. The amended and current version provides:
If, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he or she is out of the state,
the action may be commenced within the times herein limited, after his or her coming
into or return to the state; and if, after the cause of action accrues, he or she departs
from and resides out of the state, the time of his or her absence is no part of the
time limited for the commencement of the action....
Code of Civil Procedure § 13-208, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-208 (Cum. Supp. 1984)
(emphasis added).
30. Joseph Beale suggested that concern with indefinite tolling of a claim outside the state
in which it arose was the basis for enactment of many borrowing statutes. See J. BEALE, supra
note 19, at 1622; accord Ester, supra note 9, at 42; Vernon, supra note 9, at 297.
31. See, e.g., Massman v. Duffy, 330 Ill. App. 76, 69 N.E.2d 707 (1st Dist. 1946); Book
v. Eubank, 311 Ill. App. 312, 35 N.E.2d 961 (2d Dist. 1941); McGuigan v. Rolfe, 80 II1. App.
256 (1st Dist. 1898); Story v. Thompson, 36 Ill. App. 370 (2d Dist. 1889).
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tolled, Illinois statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court
recognized in Miller v. Lockett,32 a case decided long after Hyman, that the
Borrowing Statute serves to prevent forum shopping.13 When a court rou-
tinely uses a local statute of limitations on procedural grounds to permit
claims that are barred elsewhere, plaintiffs are encouraged to forum shop
by filing claims that have little factual connection to the state in order to
take advantage of the forum state's unexpired statute of limitations.3 4 When
the Illinois statute of limitations is longer than another state's, Illinois will
attract additional litigation if it permits these claims to be litigated in Illinois.
Conversely, when Illinois borrows a foreign statute of limitations that has
expired, plaintiffs are discouraged from litigating in Illinois.3 5
Because application of the Borrowing Statute is intimately related to
tolling, the current status of the Borrowing Statute must be assessed in light
of recent changes in the Illinois law of tolling. Although the Borrowing
Statute has never been amended, the Tolling Statute has been amended by
the legislature in two significant ways. In 1973 the legislature eliminated the
tolling of cases in which the defendant, although not physically present in
Illinois, is subject to Illinois jurisdiction.3 6 The 1973 amendment makes the
32. 98 11. 2d 478, 457 N.E.2d 14 (1983).
33. Id. at 486, 457 N.E.2d 18; see also Ester, supra note 9, at 40 (stating discouragement
of forum shopping is a policy reason for enacting a borrowing statute). As conflicts scholars
have noted, a major advantage of multistate use of borrowing statutes is uniform treatment of
conflicts cases irrespective of where an action is brought. If the courts in various states do not
apply the same statute of limitations to a case, plaintiffs are encouraged to shop for an
hospitable forum whose statute of limitations has not yet run. Many Illinois cases present
obvious examples of plaintiffs forum shopping for a favorable statute of limitations. Multistate
use of borrowing statutes could reduce forum shopping by requiring courts in different states
to borrow the same statute of limitations for a conflicts case. This result has not occurred,
however, in part because of the courts' difficulty, as exemplified in the cases in this article, in
determining which statutes of limitations should be borrowed. Leflar comments that should all
states adopt borrowing statutes, uniformity of treatment of limitations in conflicts cases still
would not be achieved. R. LEFLAR, supra note 9, § 128, 257.
34. See, e.g., Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. IlI. 1969). In
Manos, the non-resident plaintiffs sued Illinois corporations based on an airline crash in Italy.
The Illinois and Italian statutes had not run but the statutes of plaintiffs' decedents' domiciles
had run. See id. at 1174; see also Emerson v. North Am. Transp. & Trading Co., 303 Ill. 282,
135 N.E. 497 (1922) (plaintiff, a California resident, sued an Illinois corporate defendant based
on an Alaskan lease transaction; Alaskan statute of limitations had run but not Illinois');
Collins v. Manville, 170 Ill. 614, 48 N.E. 914 (1897) (both parties non-residents); Glenn v.
McDavid, 316 II. App. 130, 44 N.E.2d 84 (3d Dist. 1942) (Colorado plaintiff sued estate of
Colorado resident in Illinois; Colorado statute barred the claim; Illinois statute did not).
35. The availability of obtaining a forum non conveniens dismissal does not eliminate this
type of forum shopping. This type of forum shopping occurs when no other forum is available
to the plaintiff due to the expiration of the statutes of limitations of other states with jurisdiction
over the defendant; but Illinois courts will not grant a forum non conveniens dismissal unless
an alternative forum is available. See Moore v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 99 Il. 2d 73,
457 N.E.2d 417 (1983); Torres v. Walsh, 98 Il. 2d 338, 456 N.E.2d 601 (1983).
36. The current Tolling Statute defines presence as follows:
[No person shall be considered to be out of the State or to have departed from the
State or to reside outside of the State during any period when he or she is subject
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definition of the defendant's presence in Illinois for tolling purposes identical
with the definition of a state's jurisdictional power over the defendant.
Under traditional jurisdictional principles many cases arose in which plaintiffs
were unable to obtain jurisdiction over defendants in a local forum due to
a defendant's subsequent departure from the forum state, or, for foreign
claims, due to the defendant's absence from the plaintiff's home state.17
Under these circumstances, the Illinois tolling provisions served a necessary
and valuable function by allowing Illinois plaintiffs to toll the statute of
limitations until a defendant was physically present within the state and thus
amenable to Illinois jurisdiction. The expansion of the permissible limits of
state jurisdiction," however, eliminated the vast majority of cases in which
plaintiffs were prevented from pursuing claims on a timely basis because of
lack of jurisdiction over defendants. The current Tolling Statute correctly
relates the necessity for tolling to cases in which the plaintiff cannot obtain
jurisdiction over the defendant.
While the 1973 amendment limited the range of cases subject to tolling,
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State with respect to that cause of ac-
tion . ..
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-208(b) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
37. The traditional constitutional limitations of due process, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878), prohibited states from asserting jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant unless the defendant appeared in court voluntarily or was
physically present within the state. The Pennoyer court concluded that, because each state
posessed its own independent authority, each state had exclusive jurisdiction over all persons
and property within its territory, but had no direct jurisdiction over persons or property outside
its borders. Id. at 722.
38. The Court transformed the territorial theory of Pennoyer into the due process doctrine
of "minimum contacts" in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The
theory articulated in Pennoyer had begun to erode prior to International Shoe. This doctrinal
erosion was caused by the judicial creation of the fictional concepts of consent and presence,
and by the statutory creation of agents upon whom service of process could be effectuated if
the defendant was not found within the state. See, e.g., Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,
294 U.S. 623 (1935) (upheld statute allowing service on agents of non-resident individuals doing
business in the state); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (defendant implied consent by use
of highways; service of process could be effected on a state official as an agent under a non-
resident motorist statute); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898) (a non-resident
corporation doing business within the state deemed present for jurisdictional purposes).
In International Shoe, however, the Court expressly rejected physical presence as a prerequisite
to obtaining an in personam judgement. 326 U.S. at 316. Indeed, the Court recognized that by
conducting activities in the state, non-residents often invoke the benefits and protections of
that state's laws without ever being physically present. When obligations arise from such
activities or contacts a defendant can be required to appear in court without violating the due
process safeguards, even though the contacts are minimal. Id. at 319. When the contacts are
unrelated to the litigation a higher level of activity is required. See id. at 318.
Since International Shoe, the United States Supreme Court has developed a method for
analyzing minimum contacts questions. First, "the relationship between the defendant, the
forum and the litigation" is examined. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). Regardless
of the plaintiff's relationship with the forum, jurisdiction may not be asserted if the non-
resident defendant does not have contacts with the forum state. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S.
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the Illinois Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Haughton v. Haughton39 moved
in the opposite direction. The Haughton decision declared to be unconsti-
tutional the portion of the Tolling Statute that precluded tolling when, at
the time of accrual of a claim, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was
an Illinois resident. Haughton involved a plaintiff's attempt to enforce a
1948 California judgment, which awarded support payments to the plaintiff
when both the plaintiff and the defendant were California residents. 40 The
Illinois statute of limitations applicable to foreign judgments of this type
was a five year "catch all limitation" for civil actions. Thus, if the statute
in Illinois were not tolled the plaintiff's attempt to enforce the judgment
would have been barred by the statute. The plaintiff challenged the non-
resident exclusion from the Tolling Statute, claiming that it violated the
equal protection clause of the United States and Illinois Constitutions.4
The Haughton court struck down the non-residency clause because the
court concluded that it was the plaintiff's California residence that resulted
in application of the non-residency exclusion, a discrimination that the court
believed was irrational and unnecessary. 2 In response to the Haughton
320, 327 (1980). Second, the Supreme Court has determined that a defendant's contact with
the state must be such that the defendant could reasonably anticipate "being haled into court"
in the forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
This criteria is met when there is "some act by which defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the State .... Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958). The reasoning behind this principle is that a defendant, having availed himself or
herself of the benefits and protections of a state's laws, cannot object to the legal obligations
which go along with those benefits.
39. 76 Ill. 2d 439, 394 N.E.2d 385 (1979).
40. Id. at 443, 394 N.E.2d at 387.
41. Id. Plaintiff also argued that the use of a five-year limitations period for domestic
judgments deprived her of equal protection of the law. Id. at 443, 394 N.E.2d at 387. In view
of the disposition of the case, the court felt it unnecessary to decide this constitutional issue.
42. Id. at 444, 394 N.E.2d at 388. In striking down the non-residency clause the court
concluded that it was plaintiff's California residence which resulted in application of the non-
residency exclusion. Id. at 445-46, 394 N.E.2d at 388. The court was impressed that had either
the plaintiff or the defendant been a resident of Illinois at the time of the California judgment,
even though the cause of action might be labeled foreign, tolling nonetheless would have
protected the viability of the plaintiff's judgment. The court, in what can only be characterized
as a puzzling opinion, could discern no legitimate state interest or "any other rational basis"
for the exclusion of such non-residency causes of action from the Tolling Statute. Id. at 445,
394 N.E.2d at 388. To the contrary, the court expressed concern that "deserving judgment
holders" would be denied relief in the Illinois courts because they failed to anticipate the
judgment debtor's future movement into the state prior to termination of the otherwise
applicable Illinois statute of limitations. Id. at 446, 394 N.E.2d at 389.
The Supreme Court ignored the alternative issue presented in the case challenging the
discriminatory statute of limitations applicable to foreigr judgments. The Supreme Court has
suggested that discriminatory treatment of foreign judgments is unconstitutional in several of
its decisions. See Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188 (1966); Union Nat'l Bank v. Lamb, 337
U.S. 38 (1949); McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312 (1839). Illinois' treatment of foreign judgments
is an issue with potentially broad impact; therefore, resolving the validity of foreign judgments
certainly is more pressing than determining the constitutionality of the tolling provision on
which the court focused.
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
decision, the legislature's enactment of the 1983 Code of Civil Procedure
omitted the non-residency exclusion from the Tolling Statute 3.4
These changes in the Illinois law of tolling are significant when assessing
the continued need for the Borrowing Statute. Because the 1973 amendment
has eliminated the use of tolling for cases in which the defendant is absent
from Illinois but subject to Illinois jurisdiction, the necessity of borrowing
as a counterbalance to tolling has been substantially reduced. For most
claims, both foreign and domestic, the running of the Illinois statute of
limitations will serve as an outside limit on the life of the claim in Illinois;
the perpetual tolling of the Illinois statute of limitations, even for claims
which arise out-of-state, will rarely occur. In all cases, if there are sufficient
contacts to establish Illinois jurisdiction, the Illinois statute of limitations
will begin to run.
Notwithstanding the 1973 amendment of the Tolling Statute, the Illinois
limitations period may possibly be perpetually tolled in two types of cases.
The first of these situations was created by the recent Haughton decision.
When a claim arises outside Illinois between non-residents, it is unlikely that
Illinois will have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. If the defendant
is an individual, only later transient presence or domicile will create juris-
diction. The Illinois statute of limitations will be tolled until Illinois juris-
diction is established, which may be many years after the claim arises."4 In
such cases, the Borrowing Statute continues to serve a necessary role by
providing the defendant with repose under the expired statute of limitations
of the state where the claim arises.
The second type of case that might involve the perpetual tolling of the
statute is a claim which arises outside of Illinois between an Illinois plaintiff
and a non-resident defendant in circumstances that do not create Illinois
jurisdiction. For example, suppose that a defendant injures an Illinois plain-
tiff in an automobile accident in the defendant's home state. The Illinois
statute of limitations is tolled until the defendant enters the state, because
the defendant is not subject to Illinois jurisdiction. Again, the Borrowing
Statute's intended purpose is served if an expired statute of limitations of
the situs of the accident is applied to bar the claim in Illinois litigation. As
the subsequent discussion reveals, however, the Illinois courts have refused
to apply the Borrowing Statute in this type of case. 45
CURRENT SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE BORROWING STATUTE
A. Resident Exceptions from Borrowing
Although the Borrowing Statute is unqualified and its purpose is clear,
the Illinois courts have struggled with it from the beginning. In part, this
43. See Code of Civil Procedure § 13-208, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-208 (Cum. Supp.
1984).
44. See First Nat'l Bank v. Hurlbut, 224 Ill. App. 297 (1st Dist. 1922); O'Donnell v. Lewis,
104 Ill. App. 198 (1st Dist. 1902); Collins v. Manville, 170 Ill. 614, 48 N.E. 914 (1897).
45. See infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
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struggle reflects parochial concerns. Specifically, courts have been unwilling
to apply the Borrowing Statute to bar the claim of an Illinois resident.
Oddly, this judicial exception for Illinois residents has been based on the
Tolling Statute, which the Borrowing Statute was intended to modify.
Carving out this exception from the Borrowing Statute for all Illinois
residents began with the Illinois appellate court's 1889 opinion in Story v.
Thompson."6 In Story, Illinois plaintiffs sued a Wisconsin resident in an
Illinois court to enforce a promissory note. The action would have been
barred by the Wisconsin statute of limitations." It also would have been
barred by the Illinois statute of limitations unless the Illinois statute had
been tolled. Whether the Wisconsin or Illinois statute applied should have
rested on a simple legal conclusion under the Illinois Borrowing Statute-
where the cause of action accrued.
The court in Story held, on disputed facts, that the cause of action accrued
in Illinois because the plaintiff was an Illinois resident. 48 The court further
implied that a cause of action always arises in Illinois for purposes of the
Borrowing Statute whenever the plaintiff is an Illinois resident. The court's
rationale rested on an attempt to harmonize the Borrowing Statute and the
Tolling Statute. The court implied that the Borrowing and Tolling Statutes
must be read consistently with one another. 49 Accordingly, no case that was
subject to tolling of the Illinois statute of limitations could be barred by a
foreign statute of limitations under the Borrowing Statute. The Tolling
Statute was intended to favor Illinois residents, the court explained, by
providing them with a home forum. The court inferred from this intent that
"borrowing" could never be permissible to defeat an Illinois plaintiff's tolling
rights."' Hence, the court reasoned that the Borrowing Statute could import
a foreign statute of limitations only when doing so would not cut short the
Illinois statute of limitations, which had already been extended by the Tolling
Statute. At the time of the Story decision, there was only one kind of
situation that was explicitly excluded from the Tolling Statute-a case in-
volving only non-resident parties." From this express exclusion of non-
residents from the Tolling Statute, the court gleaned a legislative mandate
that in any case involving an Illinois resident as a plaintiff, the Illinois
statute of limitations must be tolled if the defendant is not present within
the state and borrowing would be precluded.
Did the Story court correctly interpret the relationship of the Tolling and
46. 36 Il1. App. 370 (2d Dist. 1889).
47. Id. at 371.
48. Id. at 376.
49. Id. at 373-74.
50. Id. at 373.
51. The Tolling Statute provided: "[Tihis section shall not apply to any case, when, at the
time the cause of action accrued, neither the party against nor in favor of whom the same
accrued were or are residents of this state." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 19 (1975) (current version
at ch. 110, § 13-208 (1983)). This provision was declared unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Haughton v. Haughton, 76 Ill. 2d 439, 444, 394 N.E.2d 385, 387 (1979).
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Borrowing Statutes? The Story court's interpretation conflicts with the Illi-
nois Supreme Court's interpretation as explained in Hyman. The Hyman
court stated that the Borrowing Statute was not subsidiary to, but a limitation
on, the term of tolling.5 2 The Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation in
Hyman is consistent with the history of the Tolling Statute. There was no
non-resident exclusion in the Tolling Statute when the Borrowing Statute
was enacted in 1872; the non-resident exclusion was added to the Tolling
Statute a year later in 1873. 5 1 Applying the Story court's rationale to the
Tolling Statute as originally enacted would make the Borrowing Statute a
completely useless and unnecessary legislative act because at that time all
cases were subject to the Tolling Statute, irrespective of the parties' resi-
dences. Following the Story court's reasoning, that the legislature intended
the Borrowing Statute to exclude all cases to which the Tolling Statute
applied, would thus leave no cases subject to borrowing. This result reason-
ably could not have been intended by the legislature.
Likewise, the Tolling Statute itself cannot fairly support the Illinois resident
exception to the Borrowing Statute recognized by the Story court. The
legislature's action in 1873 to explicitly eliminate tolling, but not borrowing,
in cases involving only non-residents can be interpreted very differently from
the interpretation given by the Story court. The Borrowing Statute functions
to bar cases between non-residents only if the foreign statute of limitations
is expired, and of course would not apply if the foreign statute is tolled.5 4
Suits between non-resident parties are often minimally connected to Illinois
and the defendant's non-presence there would toll the Illinois limitations
statute. If both the Illinois and foreign statutes are tolled, the Borrowing
Statute would fail to eliminate the possibility of perpetual tolling. Thus, the
exclusion of non-resident cases from tolling was, consistent with Hyman, a
completion of the legislative intent of the Borrowing Statute to preclude
lengthy tolling in these out-of-state cases and discourage bringing such suits
in Illinois. This interpretation of the Tolling Statute, however, does not
require the implications of a plaintiff residency exclusion from the Borrowing
Statute.
Later cases ignored Story's tortured reasoning, but adopted the Story
court's rule-now firmly established-that Illinois plaintiffs are not subject
to the Borrowing Statute. The general adoption of the Story rule allowed a
logical extension of that rule to factual settings not envisioned by the Story
court. In Story, the court refused to apply another state's limitations law to
an Illinois plaintiff in a case that arose in Illinois and was tolled under the
Illinois statute of limitations. The Story rule, however, was extended to cases
that did not involve a tolled Illinois statute of limitations. 5 An additional
52. 83 Ill. at 261.
53. Act of Apr. 11, 1872, 1873-1874 I11. Laws 121.
54. See Norman v. Kal, 550 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Glenn v. McDavid, 316 Ill.
App. 130, 44 N.E.2d 84 (3d Dist. 1942); Morrison v. Smart, 19 111. App. 656 (4th Dist. 1886).
55. See, e.g., Emerson v. North Am.Transp. & Trading Co., 303 II1. 282, 135 N.E. 497
(1922); Chicago Mill Lumber Co. v. Townsend, 203 I11. App. 457 (1916); Nat'l Bank v. Danahy,
89 I11. App. 92 (1899).
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key distinction that later cases failed to recognize was between claims that
arose in Illinois with the defendant's subsequent departure from Illinois, as
in Story, and claims that arose outside Illinois involving a defendant who
had not been in Illinois prior to the suit. While the Illinois statute of
limitations may be tolled for both in- and out-of-state claims, the Borrowing
Statute provides different treatment for claims that arise outside Illinois.
The courts, however, have refused to apply the Borrowing Statute to either
type of claim when the plaintiff is from Illinois.5 6
Whether an exclusion from the Borrowing Statute for Illinois plaintiffs
exists for both in- and out-of-state claims, irrespective of tolling, was con-
clusively decided in 1973 by the Illinois Supreme Court in Coan v. Cessna
Aircraft.17 Both the plaintiff and the defendant in Coan were from Illinois;
the plaintiff's claim arose out of the crash of a plane that the plaintiff was
co-piloting in Kentucky. The Illinois suit, which would have been barred by
the applicable Kentucky statute, was timely filed under the Illinois statute
of limitations. Because of the defendant's Illinois residence, the Illinois
statute had not been tolled. The court declared in Coan that the Borrowing
Statute was "intended [by the legislature] to apply only to cases involving
non-resident parties." 58 The Coan court refused to bar the suit under Ken-
tucky law. The court's rationale was similar to that adopted in Story.5 9 The
court was troubled by the possible application of both tolling and borrowing
to a case. The court resolved the conflict by holding, in effect, that the two
statutes may not both be applied to the same claim. Because the only
exclusion from tolling at that time was for cases between non-residents, 60
the court concluded that the Borrowing Statute should only apply to such
cases. Coan was in essence an extension of Story because no issue of tolling
was involved and the claim arose outside of Illinois.
56. For cases where the plaintiff was excluded from the Borrowing Statute when the claim
arose in Illinois, see Hibernian Banking Ass'n v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 157 I11. 524, 41 N.E.
919 (1895); Wooley v. Yarnell, 142 III. 442, 32 N.E. 891 (1892); Berry v. Krone, 46 II1. App.
82 (3d Dist. 1891).
For cases where the plaintiff was excluded from the Borrowing Statute when the claim arose
outside Illinois, see Delta Bag Co. v. Leyland & Co., 173 II1. App. 38 (lst Dist. 1912); National
Bank v. Danahy, 89 II1. App. 92 (2d Dist. 1899); McGuigan v. Rolfe, 80 I11. App. 256 (1st
Dist. 1898). In McGuigan v. Rolfe, 80 Ill. App. 256 (1st Dist. 1898), the cause of action was
based on a contract entered into in Michigan. The defendant moved to Kentucky after liability
had accrued and then moved on to Arkansas. Meanwhile, the plaintiff moved to Illinois. Even
though the case was barred under the statutes of limitations of both Kentucky and Arkansas,
the court found that plaintiff's Illinois residence after the cause of action had arisen was
sufficient to prevent borrowing. Id. at 259. Additionally, the case was tolled until defendant's
entry into Illinois. Id. McGuigan is an example of the absurd result which can occur when the
plaintiff's exclusion from borrowing and the Tolling Statute are applied in conjunction with
each other to an out-of-state claim. Plaintiff was allowed to sue defendant in an Illinois forum
17 years after the contract was formed even though the contract was made in another state.
57. 53 11. 2d 526, 293 N.E.2d 588 (1973).
58. Id. at 529, 293 N.E.2d at 589.
59. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 51.
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The Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the Illinois
plaintiff's exclusion from the Borrowing Statute in Miller v. Lockett. 61 In
Miller, the plaintiffs were Illinois residents who were injured in an automobile
accident in Tennessee. The defendants were a non-resident individual and
an Oklahoma corporation registered to do business in Illinois. The Tennessee
statute of limitations had expired, but the Illinois statute had not. The court
refused to depart from the Coan court's residence exclusion even though the
rationale of Coan had been undercut by Haughton,62 the case in which the
Illinois Supreme Court decreed the non-resident exclusion from tolling to be
unconstitutional. Further, the Miller court held that such exclusions from
the Borrowing Statute did not violate the equal protection clauses of the
United State and Illinois Constitutions.
6
61. 98 Ill. 2d 478, 457 N.E.2d 14 (1983).
62. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. The defendants in Miller argued that
Haughton had undermined the rationale of Coan that the Borrowing Statute applied only to
cases with non-resident parties excluded from tolling. Id. at 482, 457 N.E.2d at 16. The
defendants argued that given the post-Haughton absence of a non-resident exclusion from
tolling, the Borrowing Statute should be expanded to cover all cases irrespective of the parties'
residence. Id. The court responded that legislative silence regarding Coan was an endorsement
of the resident exclusion. Id. at 483, 457 N.E.2d at 17; see also Norman v. Kal, 550 F. Supp.
736 (N.D. I1l. 1982) (federal district court reaffirmed Coan's rationale subsequent to Haughton).
63. Two Illinois cases have held resident exclusions from borrowing constitutionally valid
under the equal protection clauses: Miller v. Lockett, 98 I11. 2d 478, 457 N.E.2d 14 (1983)
(plaintiff exclusion), and Panchinsin v. Enterprise Cos., 117 Ill. App. 3d 441, 453 N.E.2d 797
(1st Dist. 1983) (defendant exclusion). It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the
constitutional overtones of limitations selection, but the courts' use of equal protection analysis
in both cases must be noted. The Supreme Court has never considered whether the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution prevents choice-of-law discrimination against
non-residents. See R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 501 (West 3d ed.
1981); J. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS 403 (1978). Both Miller and Panchinsin are correct in
their conclusions that if the discrimination bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state
objective it is permissible. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
The Supreme Court has held that a borrowing statute which excludes from its application cases
where the plaintiff is a resident does not violate the privileges and immunities clause of the
United States Constitution because a "fundamental right" is not involved. Canadian N. Ry.
v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920). A better constitutional challenge to the resident exclusions would
focus not on discrimination, but on the court's failure to select a foreign statute of limitations.
Illinois' refusal to select such foreign statutes of limitations, when the interest of the foreign
state in application of its law is strong, may violate either the full faith and credit clause or
the due process clauses of the United States Constitution. For a discussion of the cases and
analysis of the constitutional roles of these clauses in choice of law selection, see Kirgis, The
Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94
(1976), and Martin, Constitutional Limitations of Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 185
(1976). The Supreme Court has held that the forum's application of its own statute of limitations
to bar a suit permissible elsewhere does not deny or violate the full faith and credit clause of
the Constitution. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953). The "crucial factor"
in Wells was that the forum applied the same limitation to all wrongful death cases, regardless
of where they arose. Id. at 518-19. Wells does not validate the Illinois resident exclusions
because Illinois uses these exclusions to permit suits barred elsewhere, whereas in Wells the
state of Pennsylvania used its statute to bar suits permissible elsewhere. Further, Illinois "lays
an uneven hand" on suits depending both on the residence of the parties and where the cause
of action arises.
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The Miller court developed an additional rationale for a resident plaintiff's
exclusion from borrowing that the Coan court had failed to articulate. The
purpose of the Borrowing Statute, according to the Miller court, was to
prevent forum shopping by non-residents. 64 The court presumably believed
it to be justifiable to exclude an Illinois plaintiff from the Borrowing Statute
because Illinois plaintiffs are unlikely to select Illinois as a forum solely
because the Illinois statute of limitations has not expired. Illinois plaintiffs
can be expected to file suit in Illinois for both domestic and foreign claims
because a local forum is convenient and likely to be favorably disposed
toward an Illinois resident.
Unlike the defendants in Coan, however, the defendants in Miller were
not Illinois residents. Although the opinion is ambiguous with respect to the
defendants' residence, 6 the Illinois Supreme Court in Miller appears willing
to extend the Illinois plaintiff's exclusion from application of the Borrowing
Statute to cases involving a non-resident defendant. The court's failure to
recognize the different issues involved in a case that arose outside Illinois
with a non-resident defendant is disappointing. This refusal to borrow an
expired foreign statute of limitations has exacerbated the possibility of
perpetual tolling in cases brought by an Illinois plaintiff against a non-
resident defendant who is not subject to Illinois jurisdiction at the time the
claim arises.
In both Coan and Miller the Illinois Supreme Court was careful to couch
the language of its opinions in terms of creating an exclusion from borrowing
for Illinois "residents. ' 66 The striking omission of any reference to the
Illinois "plaintiffs" in these cases suggests that perhaps the court also intends
to prohibit the Borrowing Statute's application when the defendant is an
Illinois resident in suits by non-resident plaintiffs. Indeed, in a few cases the
Illinois appellate courts have concluded that the defendant's Illinois residence
64. 98 III. 2d at 486, 457 N.E.2d at 18.
65. There is an alternative interpretation of the holding in Miller. The corporate defendant
was a foreign corporation registered to do business in Illinois. The individual defendant had
not been served, and thus was not before the court. The court did not expressly determine
whether the corporate defendant was an Illinois resident or a non-resident. Corporations which
are registered to do business in Illinois have been treated as residents. See infra text accom-
panying notes 79-80. If the corporate defendant was viewed as an Illinois resident and the
individual defendant was not before the court, then Miller would be identical to Coan in that
only Illinois parties were involved. In Miller the court consistently referred to the creation of
"resident exceptions." See Miller, 98 III. 2d at 486, 457 N.E.2d at 18 (court concluded that
the Illinois limitations period would be applied to actions involving Illinois residents). Thus, it
is possible that Miller only reaffirms the earlier conclusion in Coan, that the Borrowing Statute
does not apply when all parties are Illinois residents. If this is the case, then the opinion
represents a painstaking effort by the court to conceal the nature of that conclusion.
Another mystery in Miller is the court's failure to refer to the appellate court's opinion in
Panchinsin v. Enterprise Cos., 117 II1. App. 3d 441, 453 N.E.2d 797 (1st Dist. 1983), decided
two months earlier, which created a resident defendant exclusion from borrowing. See infra
notes 66-68, 73 and accompanying text.
66. See Miller, 98 III. 2d at 480, 457 N.E.2d at 15; Coan, 53 I11. 2d at 529, 293 N.E.2d at
589.
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should prevent application of the Borrowing Statute. 67 The Illinois Supreme
Court has suggested its willingness to adopt an exception for Illinois de-
fendants, but has not yet explicitly ruled on this point. 61
In 1983 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District directly considered
the applicability of the Borrowing Statute to a suit involving Illinois defend-
ants in Panchinsin v. Enterprise Cos.69 The plaintiffs in Panchinsin were
California residents who sued for injuries suffered in California, caused by
a product formulated, made, and sold by some of the corporate defendants
in Illinois. Other corporate defendants, not doing business in Illinois, had
supplied some of the chemical components for the product.7 0 The plaintiffs
could have sued all the defendants in California under the California long-
arm statute 7 ' but the one-year California statute of limitations had already
expired. Illinois provided an attractive alternative since its two-year statute
of limitations had not yet expired, and all the defendants were subject to
Illinois jurisdiction.7 2
The defendants attempted to convince the court that the Borrowing Statute
mandated selection of the expired California statute because the claim ac-
crued in California. The defendants argued (1) that the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision in Coan related only to the application of the Borrowing
Statute to resident plaintiffs, and (2) that an exception from the Borrowing
Statute for Illinois defendants, but not non-resident defendants, in suits by
non-resident plaintiffs violated the equal protection clauses of the Illinois
and United States Constitutions.
The First District believed that it was bound by Coan to hold that suits
against resident defendants were not subject to the Borrowing Statute. The
court also determined that the defendants would not be denied equal pro-
tection of the laws if subjected to the Illinois statute of limitations. 73 Curi-
67. See Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Townsend, 203 Ill. App. 457 (2d Dist. 1916); Delta
Bag Co. v. Leyland & Co., 173 Ill. App 38 (1st Dist. 1912); Nat'l Bank v. Danahy, 89 Ill.
App. 92 (2d Dist. 1899); Hibernian Banking Ass'n v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 157 11. 524, 32
N.E. 891 (1895). But see Sarro v. Maupin, 127 Ill. App. 2d 26, 261 N.E.2d 756 (lst Dist.
1970); Hayward v. Sencenbaugh, 141 Ill. App. 395 (2d Dist. 1908). Unfortunately, the opinions
are not well-written, and it is not always possible to determine whether the courts' refusal to
apply the Borrowing Statute is based on the defendant's residence or the fact that the claim
itself arose in Illinois.
68. See Emerson v. North Am. Transp. & Trading Co., 303 Ill. 282, 135 N.E. 497 (1922).
In Emerson, plaintiff was attempting to collect on a certificate of deposit issued in Alaska by
a corporation which had its principal office in Illinois. The court refused to apply the Alaska
statute of limitations to bar the case because the court concluded both that the cause did not
accrue in Alaska (and thus did not trigger application of the Borrowing Statute) and that the
defendant's Illinois residence precluded application of the statute. Id. at 289, 135 N.E.2d at
500.
69. 117 II. App. 3d 441, 453 N.E.2d 797 (1st Dist. 1983).
70. Brief for Appellant at 6, Panchinsin v. Enterprise Cos., 117 Ill. App. 3d 441, 453
N.E.2d 797 (1st Dist. 1983).
71. Id. at 12.
72. See supra note 13.
73. The court held that the discrimination against resident defendants bore a rational
relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose and hypothesized that the reason for such
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ously, the court sidestepped an explanation of why all the corporate defendants
were considered to be Illinois residents.
Apparent judicial hostility toward the Borrowing Statute may have moti-
vated the creation of these sweeping resident exceptions to the Borrowing
Statute. If the Illinois Supreme Court accepts Panchinsin's resident defendant
exclusion, the only instances in which the Borrowing Statute will be used is
in suits involving non-resident parties. It is unlikely that the legislature
intended such a limited use of the statute.
In addition to the question of whether resident exceptions comport with
the intentions of the legislature, one must question whether the judically
created resident exclusions are appropriate from a policy perspective. The
answer must be a qualified no for the following reasons:
1. The broad application of a plaintiff's resident exclusion undermines the
legislative objective of eliminating unlimited tolling of the Illinois statute of
limitations and may be unjust to non-resident defendants.
2. The resident exclusions invite forum shopping.
3. Residency cannot be defined with sufficient precision for use in these
cases.
4. The determination of residence, and emphasis on its role, diverts
attention from other factors in the case.
1. Resident Plaintiff Exclusions-Problems of
Perpetual Tolling and Fairness to Defendants
The failing of the Coan and Miller decisions lies in the Illinois Supreme
Court's refusal to distinguish between foreign claims brought against Illinois
defendants and foreign claims brought against non-resident defendants. In
the former instance, as in Coan, application of the Borrowing Statute is not
appropriate when all parties are from Illinois. In most cases between Illinois
parties the choice of law will lead to the application of Illinois substantive
law 74 and, in such cases, the limitations period also should be governed by
Illinois law. Kentucky's involvement with the parties in Coan was purely
fortuituous, and to bar that suit under Kentucky law would have been
unjust. Further, the choice of Illinois law will not lead the court to a tolled
Illinois statute of limitations; the defendant's Illinois residence will prevent
tolling.
A non-resident defendant sued on a foreign claim, however, has a greater
right to the protection of a foreign statute of limitations because of the
discrimination was (1) to protect Illinois residents and (2) to stimulate Illinois residents to
maintain high safety standards. Id. at 447, 453 N.E.2d at 801. The analysis of the court seems
strained. Even if Illinois residents are most likely to injure other residents, such cases are
excluded from borrowing by the exception for Illinois plaintiffs. The Panchinsin court asserted
an interest in the safety of products supplied to Illinois residents, and the control of defendant's
behavior. Id. Neither interest, however, was triggered in Panchinsin since not all the defendants
conducted activities in Illinois and plaintiffs were all non-residents.
74. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 I11. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1972).
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defendant's substantial ties to the state where the claim arose. This is
especially true if the defendant is a resident of the foreign state. Such cases
may require the application of foreign substantive law because of the de-
fendant's non-Illiinois residence and the accrual of the claim outside Illinois.
The justifiable use of the Illinois limitations period in these cases, as in
Miller, is less obvious than in Coan. Further, these cases present the potential
for perpetual tolling of an Illinois statute because the non-resident defendant
in an out-of-state claim may not be subject to the jurisdiction of Illinois
courts.75 If eliminating the possibility of perpetual tolling is the primary goal
of the Borrowing Statute, then Miller was incorrectly decided.
2. Resident Exclusions-Forum-Shopping
The exclusion of both resident plaintiffs and resident defendants from the
Borrowing Statute will encourage forum shopping by both plaintiffs and
defendants. In particular, after Panchinsin non-resident plaintiffs will be
encouraged to file claims in Illinois against resident defendants that are
barred by the statute of limitations in other states and that have no connection
with Illinois other than it being the defendant's residence. Further, a plaintiff
may be encouraged to assert Illinois residence in marginal cases in order to
litigate in Illinois claims barred elsewhere by taking advantage of the Illinois
statute of limitations. The amount of forum shopping will depend on the
breadth of the definition of "residence" in Borrowing Statute cases 7 6 and
will be especially troublesome in claims brought by and against corporate
defendants.
3. Corporate Residence Definition
In the Panchinsin decision the court appeared willing to treat all corporate
defendants as residents, apparently because of their qualification to do
business in Illinois. Some of the defendants, however, actually conducted
no business in Illinois. 77 If such a broad definition of corporate residence is
75. The statute of limitations is not tolled if the defendant is subject to Illinois' jurisdiction.
See Code of Civil Procedure § 13-208, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-208 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
76. Technically the legal definitions of residence and domicile differ; a party may have
several residences but only one domicile. R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 49 (West 3d ed. 1981). Domicile refers to the place where one tends to reside permanently,
while a residence may be a place where one lives temporarily, such as a summer home or
military post. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §11 comment k (1971). Illinois
courts, as is typical of many states, use the terms interchangeably to refer to a party's domicile.
Thus, the resident exclusion from the Borrowing Statute for an individual applies to parties
domiciled in Illinois.
77. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 8, Panchinsin v. Enterprise Cos., 117 App. 3d 441,
453 N.E.2d 797 (1st Dist. 1983). Residence is determined at the time the claim arises. As a
general rule in conflicts cases the courts are reluctant to allow a party's change of residence
after a claim has arisen to be taken into account in the choice of law treatment of a case. The
problems of forum shopping that may be encouraged by opportunistic plaintiffs or defendants
in large part are responsible for this judicial view. See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551,
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followed in subsequent cases, Illinois will provide an attractive forum for
many cases with no connection to Illinois other than the plaintiff or de-
fendant's alleged residence in the state. Illinois residence would easily be
established for a large, national corporation, which frequently will qualify
to do business in all states.
No Illinois case arising under the Borrowing Statute has articulated a legal
standard for the definition of corporate residence. Several cases assume that
the corporate domicile, the state of legal incorporation, determines residence
for borrowing purposes without further inquiry as to whether the corporation
conducts any business in that state.78
Under a prior version of the Tolling Statute (when residence affected
tolling), a corporation was considered an Illinois resident if it was subject
to the jurisdiction of the state.79 Three difficulties arise in attempts to apply
432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); see also Note, Post Transaction or Occurrence Events
in Conflict of Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 843 (1969) (discussing Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d
551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967)). But see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302
(1981).
In the application of the Borrowing Statute, Illinois courts similarly have taken the view that
residence is measured at the time the cause of action accrues, and subsequent moves of the
parties are not taken into account. See Hibernian Banking Ass'n v. Commercial Nat'l Bank,
157 III. 524, 41 N.E. 919 (1895); Wetzel v. Hart, 41 11. App. 2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 619 (2d Dist.
1963); First National Bank v. Hurlbut, 224 Ill. App. 297 (1st Dist. 1922). Contra McGuigan
v. Rolfe, 80 111. App. 256 (1st Dist. 1898); Berry v. Krone, 46 I11. App. 82 (3d Dist. 1892).
78. See, e.g., Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970); Mitchell v. United Asbestos Corp., 110 II1. App. 3d 485,
426 N.E.2d 350 (5th Dist. 1981).
79. Illinois case law has established that a corporation available for service of process could
invoke the protection of an Illinois statute of limitations. For example, when a corporation has
a registered agent for service of process in the state, the statute is not tolled. See Bernard Food
Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969); see also Hubbard v. United States
Mortgage Co., 14 Ill. App. 40 (1st Dist. 1883) (defendant not subject to jurisdiction in Illinois
through presence of agents viewed as non-resident); Pennsylvania Co. v. Sloan, I Ill. App. 364
(lst Dist. 1878) (defendant deemed an Illinois resident because it conducted extensive business
in the state). Contra Thornton v. Nome & Sinook Co., 260 II1. App. 76 (1st Dist. 1931). In
Thornton, the corporate defendant's principal place of business was Illinois when the cause of
action accrued. The plaintiff was a non-resident of-Illinois. The court refused to toll the statute
when the defendant ceased business operations in Illinois, since the plaintiff was not an Illinois
resident. Id. at 81-83.
Most of the cases discussed above, however, were decided before the Supreme Court's
decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), where the Supreme
Court established the "minimum contacts" test for state courts' assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion. Prior to International Shoe the courts required a finding that the corporate defendant
transacted enough business within the state to be present or to have consented to suit there.
See supra notes 36-37. Currently, some states assert jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if
it merely causes effects within a state. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37
reporter's note (1971).
A number of Illinois cases have held that the Illinois long-arm statute is co-extensive with
the due process clause of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. See, e.g., Hass v. Fancher
Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1957); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Mosele, 67 Ill. 2d
321, 368 N.E.2d 88 (1977); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); Servo
Instruments Inc. v. Fenway Mach. Co., 92 Ill. App. 3d 509, 415 N.E.2d 34 (3d Dist. 1980).
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these cases to the Borrowing Statute. First, the tolling cases that equated
corporate residence with amenability to jurisdiction were decided many years
ago, when the level of corporate activity necessary to subject a corporation
to a state's jurisdiction was much greater than that necessary under current
jurisdictional principles.8 0 Under current jurisdictional standards, most large
corporations would be viewed as Illinois residents. Second, the analogy to
Tolling Statute cases itself may be inappropriate. The treatment of a cor-
poration as a resident under the Tolling Statute eliminates the tolling of a
suit brought against a corporate defendant and decreases the likelihood of
a plaintiff forum shopping for a state with a tolled statute of limitations.
As Panchinsin demonstrates, however, the categorization of a defendant
corporation as an Illinois resident under the Borrowing Statute may promote
forum shopping. Third, and most important, the shortcoming of a general
jurisdictional definition of residence for the Borrowing Statute is that it does
not distinguish between actual corporate activities within the state as opposed
to mere qualification to do business or legal incorporation. The qualification
to do business may subject a corporation to jurisdiction of the state,8' but
this activity, without more, should not automatically subject the corporate
defendant to the Illinois statute of limitations. For the same reason, a
corporate plaintiff should not be permitted to claim exclusion from the
Borrowing Statute (as an Illinois resident) by merely qualifying to do business
in Illinois.
Aside from corporate qualification to do business, the other elements of
a jurisdictional definition of corporate residence are appropriate. Corporate
domicile (legal incorporation) represents a deliberate attempt by a corporation
to benefit from a legal association with the state of incorporation, even
though the corporation may transact no business within that state. The
corporate domiciliary is not unlawfully burdened by the use of a local statute
of limitations for all claims, including those which arise out of the state.
Similarly, a corporation's continued transaction of business within a state,
sufficient to establish general jurisdiction, also signifies a substantial cor-
porate presence and justifies the application of a local statute of limitations
to both in- and out-of-state claims against that defendant. 2
The Illinois Supreme Court has refined this position by its recent pronouncement that the
Illinois long-arm statute "should have a fixed meaning without regard to the changing concepts
of the 'minimum contacts' test under the due process clause of the Constitution." Green v.
Advance Ross Elec. Corp., 86 Ill. 2d 431, 436, 427 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (1981).
80. See, e.g., Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915); Moulin v. Trenton Mut. Life
& Fire Ins. Co., 25 N.J.L. 57 (1855).
81. Business Corporation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 5.25 (Supp. 1984), provides for
service of process on a foreign corporation having a certificate of authority to transact business
by service of its registered agent or the Secretary of State.
82. While location of corporate headquarters within the state establishes general jurisdiction,
a less substantial level of corporate activity also suffices. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Maunder v. Dehavilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd., 102 Ill. 2d 342,
466 N.E.2d 217 (1984); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260
N.Y.S.2d 625 (1969); see also Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170, 1175
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When a corporation is subject only to long-arm jurisdiction of the state,
a more limited definition of residence is appropriate. If the corporation is
subject to long-arm jurisdiction of a state for a particular claim, the minimum
contacts with the state, which establish jurisdiction for that claim, also
justify treating the corporation as a resident for that claim. Under the
jurisdictional test, the court must ascertain that the corporation's "minimum
contacts" with the state are related to the claim.83 The same nexus should
be required for application of a local statute of limitations as is required to
find jurisdiction.
These alternate definitions of corporate residence, while admittedly broad,
avoid the imposition of a nationwide corporate residence under a "qualifi-
cation to do business" definition. In addition to being fairer to the corporate
defendant, these definitions would reduce the amount of forum shopping
both by corporate plaintiffs and against corporate defendants.
4. Diversion of Judicial Attention
The discussion thus far has suggested that the residence exclusions operate
too broadly, without allowing the courts to focus on other factors in statute
of limitations selection. In Miller, for example, the plaintiff's residence
exception was extended without any consideration of the foreign states'
competing interests in protecting the defendant parties from application of
a longer Illinois limitations period. All of the cases demonstrate a blind
refusal to consider the policy implications underlying the residence excep-
tions. The following discussion will consider other relevant factors which
also should be considered in the limitations selection decision.
B. Where Does a Claim Arise?
The Illinois Borrowing Statute directs the court to borrow the expired
statute of the place where a claim "arises," but does not define the term
"arises." The statute was enacted when American choice of law rules,
including the Illinois rule, reflected an assumption that parties acquired
vested rights based on the territorial situs of a particular transaction.14 Since
(N.D. 111. 1969) (adopting a "doing business" definition of residence); 28 U.S.C. §1332(c)
(1982) ("principal place of business" definition of residence is used to establish diversity
jurisdiction). The "principal place of business" definition of corporate residence is not without
problems. It can be difficult to ascertain the principal place of business of a large national
company. M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 22 (2d ed. 1979).
83. See, e.g., Green v. Advance Ross Elec. Corp., 86 Il1. 2d 431, 427 N.E.2d 1203 (1981);
People v. Parsons Co., 122 11. App. 3d 590, 461 N.E.2d 658 (2d Dist. 1984); Loggans v.
Jewish Community Center, 113 Ill. App. 3d 549, 447 N.E.2d 919 (1st Dist. 1983).
84. The originator of the vested rights approach was A.V. Dicey, the English scholar and
jurist. See A.V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO CONFLICT OF
LAWS ch. 1 (1st ed. 1896). The American version was developed by Joseph Beale, who gave
Dicey's vested rights concept a territorial status. See D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS
5-7 (1966). Beale was primarily responsible for the First Restatement which places heavy
territorial emphasis on choice of law principles. R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 6 (West 3d ed. 1981).
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most rights were transitory, a plaintiff could seek recognition of the right
in any forum that had jurisdiction over the necessary parties. Once the court
attached a situs to the key event in an occurrence or transaction, a plaintiff's
rights, if any, could be determined and enforced under the law of the "situs"
state. s5 For example, for many years American courts accepted the maxim
that in a personal injury suit a plaintiff's vested rights were determined by
the law of the state where a harmful force impinges upon the plaintiff's
body, commonly known as a "last events" test. 6 Under a vested rights
approach, the validity of a contract was assessed under the law of the state
where the contract was signed."
In early cases under the Borrowing Statute, courts interpreted "the place
where a claim arose or accrued," using accepted principles of vested rights
theory, to refer to the geographic situs of a transaction. The concept of
accrual in the Borrowing Statute thus coincided with the general framework
of choice of law rules for substantive rights of recovery as established by
vested rights principles. Although in the abstract the rule seems easy to
apply, in many cases the elements of a claim do not center on one state. As
a result, it has been difficult for the courts to agree on the meaning of where
a claim "arises."
Many cases under the Borrowing Statute were actions brought on written
obligations in debt.8" These cases present a good case study of the difficulty
the courts have encountered in defining the situs of a claim; it is difficult
to attach a single situs to these transactions because the elements of the
claim may relate to several states. 89 The courts have been unable to pinpoint
the precise moment in the stream of events when a claim has arisen.
Some courts have concluded that the place of accrual is the place where
an obligation is entered into and made payable, if both these events take
place in the same state. 90 Other courts conclude that the plaintiff's residence
85. One author commented: "The foundation principle of the Conflict of Laws is situs.
Every element in every transaction known to the law has a situs somewhere, and the law of
the situs will regulate and control the legal effect of the, element." R. MINOR, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 51 (1901).
86. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §377 (1934).
87. Id. §332.
88. See, e.g., Glenn v. McDavid, 316 III. App. 130, 44 N.E.2d 84 (3d Dist. 1942); First
Nat'l Bank v. Hurlbut, 224 Ill. App. 297 (1st Dist. 1922); Hayward v. Sencenbaugh, 141 Ill.
App. 395 (2d Dist.'1908).
89. It is possible that different states may be the situs of a) the negotiation; b) the formal
execution of the obligation; c) the delivery of the consideration; and d) the site where repay-
ment is due. It is unclear whether the claim arises where the contract is formed or where the
debtor or creditor is located when the debt becomes due.
90. See, e.g., Collins v. Manville, 170 III. 614, 48 N.E. 914 (1897). In Collins, the plaintiff
was a resident of New Jersey when the note in question was executed, but later moved to
Colorado, residing there at the time the note was due. The defendant was a citizen of New
York. The court concluded that the cause of action accrued in New York, the state in which
the note was made and executed, and applied the New York statute of limitations to bar the
suit. Id. at 615, 48 N.E. at 914-15. In First Nat'l Bank v. Hurlbut, 224 Ill. App. 297 (1st Dist.
1922), the plaintiff, a Colorado resident, was suing the defendant on notes executed, delivered
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determines where a debt arises when the creditor/plaintiff is an Illinois
plaintiff.9 Some Illinois courts have adopted yet a different approach to
defining accrual in debt cases-that the most important element to determine
the location of a claim's accrual is the location of the debtor at the time the
obligation becomes due. 92 When both the plaintiff and the defendant are
not Illinois residents at the time a cause of action has accrued, the courts
have defined accrual as occurring in any state in which the debtor is amenable
to a court's jurisdiction for the duration of that state's limitations period. 93
Thus, if the defendant has resided in any state after the accrual of the action
for the duration of such state's statute of limitations, the case is barred by
"borrowing" that state's statute of limitations.
Perhaps these divergent definitions of situs merely reflect the logical
difficulty of assigning a single situs to a multistate transaction. Arguably,
the debtor's residence, creditor's residence, and the location of the loan
transaction all relate to the claim in equal fashion. The inherent ambiguity
of situs has prevented the courts from using situs as a criterion to apply the
Borrowing Statute consistently from case to case; the shortcomings of situs
as a criterion for determining where a claim arises extend not just to debt
cases, but also to tort and general contract claims. 94
and payable in Colorado. The defendant, a Colorado resident at the time the notes became
due, later moved to Illinois. Under the rationale of Collins, the court concluded that the cause
of action accrued in Colorado due to defendant's execution and delivery of the notes in
Colorado. Id. at 298-300.
91. See, e.g., Berry v. Krone, 46 111. App. 82 (3d Dist. 1891); Story v. Thompson, 36 Ill.
App. 370 (2d Dist. 1889).
92. See National Bank v. Danahy, 89 Ill. App. 92 (2d Dist. 1899); Great W. Tele. Co.
v. Stubbs, 55 IIl. App. 210 (Ist Dist. 1894); see also Wooley v. Yarnell, 46 Ill. App. 112,
aff'd, 142 I11. 442, 32 N.E.2d 891 (1891) (Illinois statute of limitations applied even though
neither creditor nor debtor were Illinois residents at the time the suit actually commenced).
93. See, e.g., Strong v. Lewis, 204 I11. 35, 65 N.E. 556 (1903); Hyman v. McVeigh, 10
Chicago Legal News, Jan. 21, 1878, at 157, col. 1 (111. Sup. Ct. 1878); Hyman v. Bayne, 83
111. 256 (1876). But see McGuigan v. Rolfe, 80 II1. App. 256 (lst Dist. 1898). In McGuigan,
the defendant incurred a debt in Michigan where both he and the plaintiff resided. After the
claim accrued, the plaintiff moved to Illinois. Id. at 257. The defendant resided in two separate
states, Kentucky and Arkansas, for longer than their respective limitation periods. However,
the court held that only the running of the Michigan statute could bar the action since that
was the state where the debt accrued. Id. at 259-60.
94. Delta Bag Co. v. Leyland & Co., 173 Ill. App. 38 (1st Dist. 1912), is a fitting example
of the difficulty courts encounter in attaching a situs or place of accrual to some torts. In
Delta, the plaintiff claimed that his cargo had been damaged while being transported from
Liverpool, England to New Orleans, Louisiana. Id. at 39. The court did not discuss the point
at which the injury occurred, although from the facts it appeared that the damage to the goods
occurred on the high seas. Apparently the point of injury was not dispositive, however, because
the court found that the Illinois statute of limitations applied because the defendant was an
Illinois resident. Id. at 41. In another case, Janeway v. Burton, 201 111. 78, 66 N.E. 337 (1903),
the defendant in a replevin suit argued that the action had accrued in New Jersey, where the
wrongful taking of his goods had occurred, and thus the New Jersey statute barred the action.
Id. at 78-79, 66 N.E. at 337. The court, however, decided without discussion that the claim
had arisen in Illinois presumably due to the plaintiff's residence there. Id. The plaintiff thus
benefited from the tolled Illinois statute of limitations.
Yet another example of judicial manipulation of the accrual definition which favors a domestic
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The divergent definitions of situs, however, reflect an additional consid-
eration. The thread that weaves the debt cases together is the courts' obvious
opposition to the use of the Borrowing Statute to bar an Illinois resident's
claim. In many cases, the courts have focused upon the factual element of
the transaction that allows the courts to conclude that the claim arose in
Illinois, and thus avoid using the Borrowing Statute. 95 When the plaintiff is
a non-resident, the courts are more inclined to find a non-Illinois situs and
select a foreign statute of limitations to bar the claim in Illinois. 96 Indeed,
in some cases with non-resident plaintiffs and defendants the courts have
applied the situs rule very broadly to find that the claim arose in any
jurisdiction in which a limitations period has expired due to the defendant's
presence there, and have consequently applied that state's limitations period
to bar the claim. 97
The situs cases, like the residence cases, reveal judicial antagonism toward
the use of the Borrowing Statute. The difference between the cases is merely
technique. Some courts have openly refused to borrow foreign statutes in
cases with Illinois plaintiffs; 9 other courts have used the less direct, but
equally effective, method of manipulating the situs of a claim. 99
The vested rights/last events rule was a primary reason for the courts'
difficulty in deciding where a claim arose in older cases. The principle of
attaching a location to a claim is appropriate for choice of law purposes,
but the vested rights attempt to attach geographic location to a claim on the
basis of a set of rigid rules failed. Later Borrowing Statute cases in Illinois
suggest displeasure with a simple vested rights approach to determining the
location of a claim's accrual and indicate a search for broader rules.
In general, enormous change in judicial thought respecting conflicts prob-
lems has taken place in Illinois in recent years. °0 In 1971, the Illinois Supreme
Court jettisoned the last events test in selecting the law in a torts case in
plaintiff in a contract case is Orschel v. Rothschild, 238 Il1. App. 353 (1st Dist. 1925). The
plaintiff and defendant had entered into an indemnity contract in Michigan when defendant
was a Michigan resident and plaintiff an Illinois resident. Id. at 354-56. The defendant later
became liable for losses under the contract, triggered by the plaintiff's liability endorsement of
commercial paper in Illinois, and his later liability for losses arising out of the endorsement.
The court concluded that the action accrued in Illinois when the plaintiff, an Illinois resident,
made his last payment upon the endorsement. Id. at 357. It would seem just as logical, however,
to conclude that the claim arose in Michigan, as a result of the defendant's default in Michigan.
95. See supra note 56; see also Janeway v. Burton, 201 Il1. 78 (1903) (although taking of
property occurred in New Jersey, court concluded cause of action accrued in Illinois).
96. Compare First Nat'l Bank v. Hurlbut, 224 Ill. App. 297 (1922) (claim barred under
Colorado law where defendant moved to Illinois after cause of action accrued) with McGuigan
v. Rolfe, 80 I11. App. 256 (1st Dist. 1898)(court refused to borrow and concluded claim accrued
in Illinois when plaintiff moved to Illinois after accrual of a debt claim).
97. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 46-51, 55-68 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Conviser, Conflict of Laws: Inching Forward Slowly, 23 DE PAUL L. REV.
89 (1973); Conviser, Conflict of Laws: Alas, Confusion Still Reigns, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 16
(1972); Polelle, Conflict of Laws-One Inch Forward, A Half Inch Backward, 24 DE PAUL L.
REV. 320 (1975).
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favor of the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the
claim, 0 1 which in turn is based on the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws (Second Restatement) most significant relationship analysis. The Sec-
ond Restatement supplants rules with standards that require consideration
of values that typically were ignored under vested rights rules. The many
factual contacts of a case with various states, together with the policies of
the states, are now analyzed to determine the applicable law in a case with
multistate contacts. 02 As one Illinois court stated:
The desire to isolate and analyze the actual interests of the various
jurisdictions in the litigation has given rise to a three-step process:
".. .first to isolate the issue, next to identify the policies embraced
in the laws in conflict, and finally to examine the contacts of the
respective jurisdictions to ascertain which has a superior connection
with the occurrence and thus would have a superior interest in having
its policy or law applied."'0 3
The most significant relationship analysis has clearly influenced the judicial
definition of claim accrual in some Borrowing Statute cases. For some courts
the state where a claim arises is the state with the most significant relationship
to the claim-the state whose law properly determines the substantive rights
of the parties. The courts, however, have had difficulty understanding the
Second Restatement analysis in the Borrowing Statute context. As a result,
their opinions have not usually provided predictable or satisfactory resolution
of Borrowing Statute issues.
The only state court decision to use a most significant relationship analysis
of claim accrual was the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District in
101. See, e g., Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 II1. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); see also Ehrman v.
Cook Elec. Co., 468 F. Supp. 98 (N.D. III. 1979) ("most significant relationship" test applied
to contracts case); Champagnie v. W.E. O'Neil Constr. Co., 77 III. App. 3d 136, 395 N.E.2d
990 (1st Dist. 1979) (public policy doctrine, which would have precluded application of Wisconsin
law despite injury occurring in Wisconsin, was rejected in favor of "most significant relation-
ship" test). Federal courts in diversity cases are required to apply the choice-of-law rules of
the state in which they sit. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). This
result is dictated by the principle of state and federal court uniformity of Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
102. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (Second Restatement) was adopted by
the American Law Institute in 1969. For each subject matter area-torts, contracts, property-
the Second Restatement requires location of specific factual connections of the state to a case.
For torts, § 145(2) requires the court to determine (a) where the injury occurred; (b) the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (d) place where the parties' relationship
is centered. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971). The contacts are
evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue, and in light
of the principles of § 6, which includes (a) the relevant policies and interests of the forum and
other states; (b) protection of justified expectations of the parties; (c) basic policies underlying
a particular field of law; and (d) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result. Id. § 6.
103. Mitchell v. United Asbestos Corp., 100 Ill. App. 3d 485, 494, 426 N.E.2d 350, 356-57
(5th Dist. 1981) (citations omitted).
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Mitchell v. United Asbestos Corp.104 The plaintiff in Mitchell brought a
wrongful death action for her husband's death from asbestosis. The disease
allegedly developed while her husband, a Missouri resident who died in
Missouri, worked for various employers in Illinois and Missouri installing
asbestos products made by the defendants. 15 The defendants were foreign
corporations that did business in Illinois. The Missouri statute of limitations
had expired, but the Illinois statute had not. In Mitchell, the court would
not have been able to locate the place of accrual of the claim under a last
events/vested rights test. Under a last events test, the decedent's exposure
to the harmful material, rather than his death, 10 6 would constitute the last
event but the decedent's exposure to asbestos was evenly divided between
Illinois and Missouri. Thus, the court turned to the most significant rela-
tionship analysis to decide where the claim accrued under the Borrowing
Statute. 107
The Mitchell court first concluded that the Illinois Wrongful Death Statute08
would govern the substantive elements of the plaintiff's claim, such as the
amount of statutory damages recoverable, because Illinois law directly fur-
thered both Illinois' and Missouri's "policies of recovery."' 1 9 According to
the court, it would be inconsistent to find that the claim arose outside of
Illinois for purposes of the Borrowing Statute once it had determined that
Illinois law would control the substantive issues in the case." 0 Thus, the
Mitchell court adopted a system by which both the substantive and limitations
laws would be drawn from the same juridiction. The law chosen to govern
the substantive issues controlled the limitations choice by dictating where the
claim arose.
This method of limitations selection has been referred to as the "controlling
jurisdiction" analysis."' It avoids the blind selection of the limitations law
where fortuitious events transpired under a situs test. Accordingly, the
Mitchell court favored the law of the state found to be the state with the
most substantial relationship to substantive matters in the suit. The Mitchell
court's broader perspective, however, eliminates separate consideration of
the statute of limitations issue and, as a result, loses flexibility.
The federal courts in Illinois diversity suits have used the most significant
104. 100 Ill. App. 3d 485, 426 N.E.2d 350 (5th Dist. 1981).
105. Id. at 489, 426 N.E.2d at 353.
106. Id. at 491-94, 426 N.E.2d at 354-57.
107. Id. at 499, 426 N.E.2d at 360.
108. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1, 2 (1983).
109. 100 Ill. App. at 496-97, 426 N.E.2d at 358-60. The court concluded that Illinois' interest
in deterring such conduct and in permitting full recovery outweighed Missouri's interest in
limiting recovery and thus applied Illinois law. Id.
110. Id. at 500, 426 N.E.2d at 360.
111. The "controlling jurisdiction" approach has been suggested by several scholars. It was
originated by Ernest Lorenzen, the author of Comment, The Statute of Limitations and the
Conflict of Law, 28 YALE L.J. 492 (1919). See also Note, An Interest-Analysis Approach to
the Selection of Statutes of Limitation, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 304-06 (1974) (suggesting that
failure to borrow a foreign jurisdiction's longer statute of limitations may be contrary to the
principles of federalism).
1985]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
relationship analysis in conjunction with the Borrowing Statute in three
cases, two before the district court and one before the Seventh Circuit.'12
While none of the cases is a model of Second Restatement analysis, the
Seventh Circuit opinion in Hamilton v. General Motors Corp."3 is the
weakest of the three.
The decedent in Hamilton, a California resident, had provided services to
the defendant, a national corporation. These services included consultation
and testifying on the defendant's behalf in an antitrust lawsuit brought
against the defendant. The plaintiff, decedent's wife, sought to recover for
the services the decedent had provided. The Illinois statute of limitations
was five years; the California statute of limitations was two years and had
expired. The decedent had met with the defendant's attorneys both in
California and Illinois in preparation for the trial. His deposition was taken
in California; he never testified in Chicago."14 The court concluded that the
contract's place of accrual under the Borrowing Statute should be determined
under a most significant relationship test." 5 Without explanation, unfortu-
nately, the court concluded that the state with the most significant relation-
ship to the case was Illinois, because the decedent provided services in
connection with a trial in that state.
The parties' many California contacts, which the court ignored, implied
substantial California involvement and should have triggered an analysis of
the clash between Illinois and California law. That additional policy analysis
might have changed the court's limitations decision. Given California's short
statute of limitations, it can be concluded that California did not appear
overly concerned with the ability of its plaintiff to recover and thus presum-
ably would select its expired statute of limitations to bar the suit in California.
Illinois had little reason to provide a forum for the enforcement of a service
contract pursuant to which the primary services were rendered outside Illi-
nois. In light of the apparent disinterest of both states, a preferable result
may have been the selection of the California statute to dismiss the claim
under the Borrowing Statute.
112. See infra notes 114-30 and accompanying text; see also Templeman v. Baudhuin Yacht
Harbor, Inc., 608 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1979) (court stated that significant factors should be
weighed, yet failed to weigh Illinois' condiderations except to favor a resident-plaintiff).
Templeman was decided under Illinois law after being transfered to the First Circuit, and the
court applied the Illinois Borrowing Statute. Illinois residents brought tort and contract actions
against a Wisconsin yacht seller over a yacht which sank in Puerto Rico while on a voyage
from Puerto Rico to the Virgin Islands. Id. at 916. The statutes of limitations of Illinois,
Wisconsin, Michigan (situs of delivery), and Florida (situs of repairs) all would have permitted
the case; the Puerto Rico statute of limitations had expired. The court explicitly rejected the
"last events" test for accrual, which would have given the claim a Puerto Rican situs. Id. at
917-18. Accrual of both the contract and tort claims were decided under a "most significant
relationship" test. Although the court did not conclude which state had the most significant
relationship to the case, it reasoned that Puerto Rico had the "least significant" relationship
and thus its statute of limitations could not be selected to bar the claims. Id. at 918.
113. 490 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1973).
114. Id. at 225-26.
115. Id. at 225 n.l.
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The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois used
the most significant relationship test to define the place of accrual of a tort
claim for borrowing purposes in Klondike Helicopters, Ltd. v. Fairchild
Hiller Corp."16 While the Klondike court's analysis of the facts was superior
to the Hamilton court's analysis, like Hamilton, Klondike failed to address
the broader policy issues concernining limitations selection. The plaintiff in
Klondike sued the defendant, a helicopter manufacturer, in tort and contract
for damages he suffered in the crash of a helicopter that he had purchased
from the defendant.' 1 7 The defendant manufactured the helicopter in Cali-
fornia. The contract of sale was executed, and the aircraft was delivered, in
California. The plaintiff, a British Columbian citizen, used the aircraft in
British Columbia, where the accident occurred. The corporate defendant was
domiciled in Maryland and shortly after the delivery of the aircraft terminated
its California operations. The California statute of limitations had expired,
but the statutes of British Columbia and Illinois had not. For the tort claim
the court used the most significant relationship analysis under the Borrowing
Statute to determine, not how the states were related to the claim, but where
the parties' relationship with each other was centered. According to the
court, the parties' relationship originated in California when the aircraft was
delivered, and shifted to British Columbia when the plaintiff used the plane
there with the defendant's knowledge."18 British Columbia's relationship to
the claim buttressed the court's conclusion that the tort "arose" in British
Columbia and was maintainable under British Columbian law. In contrast
with that approach, however, the contract claim was subjected to the terri-
torialist contract "place of execution and delivery" rule, seemingly because
the court did not believe that an Illinois court would apply a Second
Restatement analysis to contract claims. Applying the situs rule, the court
dismissed the contract claim because of the expired California statute of
limitations. 119
Klondike illustrates why the Second Restatement analysis, with its broader
consideration of the many factual elements in a conflicts case, is preferable
to the last events rule for defining where a claim arises. In Klondike, the
116. 334 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
117. Id. at 893.
118. Id. at 894.
119. Id. at 896. Klondike was decided the year after the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the
most significant relationship principles in a tort case. Thus, the court's reluctance to utilize the
theory in a contract case without express state decisional guidance is understandable. Cf. Manos
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. I11. 1969) (court refused to "stretch
the guidelines" leaving the job to the Illinois Supreme Court or Illinois legislature). In Manos,
the Northern District of Illinois pointedly refused to abandon the "last events" definition of
where a claim arose. Id. at 1175-76. Manos was decided, however, prior to the Illinois Supreme
Court's adoption of the "most significant relationship" analysis in Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill.
2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970). Currently, the federal courts may be less reluctant to adopt a
Second Restatement analysis for contract claims given the continuing failure of the Illinois
Supreme Court to decide this issue. See, e.g., Overseas Dev. Disc Corp. v. Sangamo Constr.
Co., 686 F.2d 498, 511 (7th Cir. 1982) (concluding that Illinois was "about to adopt" such
analysis for contracts).
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court considered not just where the accident occurred, but also where events
preceding the crash took place. These preceding contacts would be omitted
from a vested rights analysis. Although Klondike's analysis was more exten-
sive than Hamilton's, the factual analysis was far from complete. Because
residence plays a major role in a Second Restatement analysis, the court
also should have discussed how the parties' residences related to the statute
of limitations selection. E0 The parties' residences may have been as significant
as where the parties negotiated with each other because limitations periods
are thought to reflect a state's solicitude for repose and the rights of particular
parties. For example, California may have had no reason to apply its
limitations period to bar either the contract or tort claim because there was
no California resident defendant to protect. On the other hand, British
Columbia had very direct involvement both with the accident and with one
of the parties, the plaintiff. Accordingly, British Columbian law properly
governed the limitations period applicable to the tort claim.1
21
Although the most significant relationship definition of place of accrual
of a claim has the advantage of a less rigid determination of situs, its
application led to surprising results when the court in Nutty v. Universal
Engineering Corp.2 2 engaged in simple contact counting. 2a The Second
Restatement, with its reliance on multiple factual elements in a case, some-
times encourages a court to engage in contact counting for choice of law
issues. This is a process in which the court simply selects the law of the state
with the most factual ties to the claim regardless of the contact's significance.
For example, in Nutty an Illinois plaintiff brought a products liability suit
in Illinois for injuries he suffered from equipment manufactured by the
defendant Universal. The plaintiff was taken to a Missouri hospital where
he was treated by the hospital and its physicians. The hospital and the
physicians were added as defendants just short of four years after the
injury. 24 The Borrowing Statute was not applicable to the plaintiff's claim
against the newly added defendants because of the plaintiff's Illinois resi-
dence. Although the Illinois statute had expired, the court invoked the
doctrine of equitable estoppel to deny the defendants' defense under Illinois
limitations law. 25
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 comment e (1971).
121. Under a Second Restatement analysis, significant factual contacts in the contracts count
differed and were evenly divided. The factors to be taken into account would have included:
(a) the place of contracting (California); (b) the place of performance (California); (c) the
location of the contract's subject matter (California); and (d) the place of the parties' business
and residence (California, British Columbia, and Maryland). Id. § 188(2). In light of the
diversity of contacts, California law may have best reflected its more direct involvement with
the commercial elements of the case, and resultant interest in regulating the rights of parties
who have transacted business in California. Thus, the contracts claim may have been properly
dismissed under California law, but the court's analysis for the contract claim ignored this type
of policy-based consideration of the proper law.
122. 564 F. Supp. 1459 (S.D. Ill. 1983).
123. See supra note 102 (discussion of the Second Restatement's § 145 contact counting).
124. 564 F. Supp. at 1461.
125. Id. at 1464.
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After the plaintiff added the hospital and the doctor as defendants,
defendant Universal filed a third-party complaint seeking contribution. To
determine whether the contribution claim arose in Illinois or Missouri for
the selection of a statute of limitations under the Borrowing Statute, the
court considered the contribution claim as a separate issue. Unlike the
plaintiff's claim, the contribution claim was presumably subject to the
Borrowing Statute because all the parties were treated as non-residents. 2 6
Although the court considered it possible that the contribution claim arose
"in the courtroom of ... [the Illinois] court,' ' 27 thus giving the contribution
claim an Illinois locus, the court concluded that the claim arose in Missouri,
the state with the most significant relationship. According to the Nutty court,
Missouri had a closer relationship to the claim because: (a) the plaintiff's
injury occured in Missouri; (b) the third-party defendants' conduct occured
in Missouri; and (c) the third-party defendant-hospital was a Missouri
corporation doing business exclusively in Missouri. 28 Significantly, the choice
of Missouri law included its limitations period. Although in some states the
limitations period for a contribution claim begins after adjudication of
liability, 2 9 the court determined that under Missouri case law, contribution
claims against physicians and hospitals must be commenced within two years
of the occurrence of the original negligent act. The defendant Universal had
little, if any, opportunity to file a contribution claim against the medical
defendants within two years of the alleged negligent act because the plaintiff's
initial action was filed one year and nine months after his injury, and the
additional defendants were not added by the plaintiff until almost four years
after his injury.3 0 Thus, under the guise of selecting a statute of limitations,
the court determined the third-party plaintiff's right to contribution under
Missouri law. Use of the Missouri limitations period for the non-resident
third-party plaintiff's contribution claim, and Illinois law for the resident
plaintiff's claim, resulted in dismissal of the medical defendants only from
the contribution action. This selective dismissal left the third-party plaintiff
potentially liable for the plaintiff's entire claim without a determination of
the relative fault of the defendant in a contribution lawsuit. This selective




129. Illinois law has changed recently. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in November 1984
that contribution claims must be filed by a defendant during the original action. Laue v.
Leifheit, 105 II1. 2d 191, 473 N.E.2d 939 (1984). Prior to Laue the statute of limitations on
the contribution claim ran from either the judgment date against the defendant or payment by
the defendant. See Sherman House Hotel Co. v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 168 I11. App.
549, 554 (1st Dist. 1912) (statute of limitations did not apply because it was not an action to
recover damages for an injury). But see Tisoncik v. Szczepankiewicz, 113 111. App. 3d 240, 446
N.E.2d 1271 (1st Dist. 1983).
130. 564 F. Supp. at 1466. The defendants thus had three months to discover the third-party
defendants' involvement and join these parties. However, that possibility seemed theoretical since
the plaintiff had not yet discovered their involvement.
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dismissal, while probably the result of judicial inadvertence, suggests the
court's discrimination on behalf of a resident plaintiff.
The Second Restatement analysis in Nutty fails because the court me-
chanically applied the analysis only to the contribution action, without
investigation of how the clash of Illinois and Missouri limitations policies
might have been reconciled as a general matter for both claims. Missouri
may have wished to extend the protective policy reflected in its short statute
of limitations to all out-of-state claims against its resident medical defend-
ants, including both the contribution and underlying claims. Thus, the
Missouri court might have dismissed the entire suit had it been filed in
Missouri. According to the court, Illinois wished to preserve the plaintiff's
claim even though the Illinois limitations statute had expired. The issue that
the Nutty court did not address was whether the solution to preserving the
plaintiff's claim, involving equitable estoppel, extended also to the non-
resident defendant/third-party plaintiff Universal. The result in Nutty sug-
gests the court's contrary opinion that Illinois lacked concern for the non-
resident plaintiff, while having obvious concern for the resident plantiff.
This would explain the court's use of Missouri law for Universal's claim
and Illinois law for the plaintiff's claim. If the differing concerns for residents
and non-residents explains the use of different law, then the result in Nutty
may be acceptable, but dissapointing. The better approach would have been
for the court to admit that statute of limitations decisions differ depending
on the residence of the plaintiff.
A consistent definition of where a claim arises is crucial to proper appli-
cation of the Borrowing Statute. A framework for analysis, whether the
vested rights or Second Restatement rules, must be available to the court;
without such guidance the Borrowing Statute presents opportunity for judicial
manipulation or avoidance. Neither the traditional rules nor the Second
Restatement have provided the necessary guidance.
The vested rights/last events rule fails because of its rigidity and superfi-
ciality. The court's attempt to pinpoint a sole factual element in a case with
multistate contacts to determine the proper limitations period is inappro-
priate. The Borrowing Statute neglects to define which events are "key"
factors. Left to their own devices, the courts quite naturally have differed
in their views concerning which factors give rise to a claim. The hollowness
of this approach rests principally on the courts' failure to look beyond a
single event to a multiplicity of factual connections of the states in these
cases.
The Second Restatement cases attempt a broader analysis of claim accrual,
yet fall short of attaining a preferable result for more complex reasons. The
Second Restatement, in theory, requires elaborate policy analysis. In the
Borrowing Statute cases, for example, the court might consider whether a
state wishes that its statute of limitations be applied to a claim that has
some factual connection with the state, such as the helicopter delivery in
Klondike, but involves only non-resident parties. Examination of the factual
connections of a case to a state, and the relationship of these connections
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to the policies expressed in a state's law, should reveal the state with the
most significant relationship to the statute of limitations issue.
The Illinois cases that used Second Restatement analysis evidence broad-
ened judicial discretion to look at multiple factual elements in a case, but
failed to relate factual events to policy concerns. In Klondike the court
examined the relationship between the parties, and in Nutty the court ex-
amined where the defendants' conduct occurred. Neither analysis would be
correct under a last events definition of where the case arose. For this reason
alone, the Second Restatement analysis is preferable to the vested rights rule.
The courts are unable, however, to accurately articulate and apply the policies
underlying a statute of limitations. These policies include repose for defend-
ants, judicial economy, and protection of plaintiffs. The discussion of these
policies was lacking in Nutty, Hamilton, and Klondike. It was used in
Mitchell only to determine the substantive choice of law in the case, with
the statute of limitations choice following that determination without separate
consideration. Thus, the influence of the Second Restatement on the Bor-
rowing Statute has been to engage the courts in contact, not policy, analysis.
The Borrowing Statute has caused this failure to engage in policy analysis
by distracting the courts away from employing a policy approach and instead
directing the courts to determine where a claim arose. The language of the
statute itself has hindered the integration of policy considerations into the
Borrowing Statute analysis. Thus, even courts that acknowledge a desire to
incorporate the Second Restatement into a borrowing analysis appear unable
to do so.
USE OF FOREIGN STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
To PERMIT SUITS BARRED UNDER ILLINOIS LAW
The Borrowing Statute has a narrow purpose: the prevention of forum
shopping and perpetual tolling. It was not intended to provide a general
approach to the selection of a statute of limitations in all conflicts cases.
Even so, the Borrowing Statute may have hampered the growth of choice
of law rules for cases outside the scope of the statute. The Borrowing Statute
states that foreign statutes of limitations are to be selected to bar cases in
Illinois, but the statute is silent on the use of foreign statutes of limitations
to permit suits barred by Illinois law. This silence may have prevented Illinois
state courts from developing satisfactory solutions to this issue.
Most jurisdictions treat statutes of limitations as procedural matters to be
decided by forum law, even though the cause of action may have arisen in
another state whose law will determine the substantive rights of the parties.",
In certain circumstances, however, a foreign statue of limitations may be so
entwined with the foreign substantive right that to recognize the foreign right
requires the forum to also recognize and incorporate the foreign statute of
limitations.'3 2 Judicial exceptions to the usual procedural label for a limita-
131. See supra note 19.
132. See O'Neal v. Nat'l Cylinder Gas Co., 103 F. Supp. 720 (N.D. I11. 1952); Smith v.
Toman, 368 I11. 414, 14 N.E.2d 478 (1938); Jackson v. Shuttleworth, 42 Ill. App. 2d 257, 192
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tions statute are used both to permit suits barred by a forum's own statute
of limitations, and to bar a suit otherwise permissible under forum law even
in states that have borrowing statutes.' 33
The use of foreign statutes of limitations under the substance/procedure
dichotomy in Illinois is meager and inconclusive. 34 No case in Illinois state
courts has applied this rationale and utilized a foreign statute of limitations.
The sole Illinois case that has defined the type of foreign limitations period
that may be used in an Illinois case is Jackson v. Shuttleworth.'3 In Jackson,
an Illinois plaintiff brought a common law personal injury suit against an
Illinois defendant arising from a Missouri automobile accident. The suit was
barred under the applicable Illinois statute, but was permissible under the
Missouri five-year statute. The plaintiff argued that "comity" required use
N.E.2d 217 (3d Dist. 1963). The exceptions to the procedural characterization have taken four
principal forms. The principal exception occurs when a new statutory right is created in
derogation of the common law, and the statute itself contains a statute of limitations. REs-
TATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 143 comment c (1971). The most typical example
is a statutory action of wrongful death. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1983). This type
of limitation is regarded as so "inextricably intertwined" with the right itself that it should be
recognized by any forum enforcing the right. Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict
of Laws, 39 MIcH. L. REV. 392, 410 (1941). The leading American case is The Harrisburg, 119
U.S. 199 (1886). In other cases, courts have reasoned that a foreign statute of limitations might
be specifically aimed at a limitation of a particular legal right as to warrant saying that it
qualified the right. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904); see also Markakis v. S.S. Volendam,
475 F. Supp. 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (recent application of the specificity test to Panamanian
law); R. LEFLAR, supra note 9, § 127, at 254 n.15. Other cases have analyzed the language of
a foreign limitations statute in order to discern whether the legislature created a procedural or
substantive limitation. Thus, a statute of limitations that merely provides that "an action shall
not be maintained" has been viewed as affecting the availability of a remedy, not the qualifi-
cation of the right; alternatively, a statute that provides that the right "shall be extinguished"
would be substantive. This is the "attributes test." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 143 reporter's note (1971); R. MINOR, CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 210 (1901). This
technique appears in older writings and cases and appears to be falling into disuse as more
modern analyses develop. Finally, a forum might look to the courts of the state of enactment
for an interpretation of whether the statute of limitations is substantive or procedural. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Linton, 178 F.2d 304, 310 (7th Cir. 1949).
133. For example, assume that a state has a borrowing statute that applies only in the event
that all parties are non-residents of the forum state. The court may be presented with a case
involving a non-resident plaintiff who seeks to recover against a resident defendant for a
wrongful death which occurred in another state. The suit is not barred under the forum's
statute of limitations but is barred under the statute of the other state. The borrowing statute
would not be available due to the defendant's residence in the forum. The court might,
nonetheless, be willing to apply the shorter statute of limitations of the place of the wrongful
death if that state's statute of limitations is part of the wrongful death statute. The result
assumes that the court desires to resolve substantive issues in the case under the foreign state's
law as an initial matter. Thus, this result would follow if the forum state uses a "place of
wrong" theory in a conflicts case. See, e.g., Ramsay v. Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir.
1970); cf. Toomes v. Continental Oil Co., 402 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1966) (involving a resident
plaintiff and non-resident defendant).
134. See Kalmich v. Bruno, 553 F.2d 549, 554 (7th Cir. 1977) (Seventh Circuit stated that it
would be "less than candid" to say that this analytical problem had been resolved in Illinois).
For a full discussion of Kalmich, see infra notes 148-58 and accompanying text.
135. 42 11. App. 2d 257, 192 N.E.2d 217 (3d Dist. 1963).
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of the Missouri limitations period. The court refused to apply the Missouri
statute because it held that the application of foreign statutes of limitations
is permissible only for statutory rights, not recognized by the common law,
that incorporate time limitations. 3 6 Common law actions clearly fall outside
this rule and, as a result, are subject to the procedural laws of the forum
state. Thus, other courts following Jackson have refused to use foreign
limitations periods to permit common law claims barred by the Illinois
statute of limitations.' 37
The Illinois Supreme Court has not addressed the characterization of a
statute of limitations for choice of law purposes. In Smith v. Toman,38
however, a case that did not involve multistate contacts, the court stated
that a statute that creates a right unknown at common law, and in which
time is made "an inherent element" of the right, is not a statute of limita-
tions. 3 9 The implication of Smith for conflicts decisions is that a foreign
statute of limitations applicable to a statutory right could be viewed instead
as a substantive law recognized by Illinois courts. Thus, Smith implicitly
endorses the holding of Jackson.
Federal courts in Illinois diversity suits have acknowledged Jackson's
holding that only foreign statutes of limitations incorporated into statutorily
created rights may be adopted in Illinois cases. 40 The federal courts' appli-
cation of Jackson, however, has not been as restrictive as the standard
announced in Jackson, which requires that a plaintiff's right be contained
in the statute itself.
The substance/procedure analysis turns on an exceedingly technical reading
of the specific wording of the foreign limitations statute, as demonstrated
by the analysis of Anderson v. Linton. ' 4' Anderson reveals the court's concern
with the degree of specificity of the foreign statute of limitations, expressly
referred to in some cases as a "specificity" test. In Anderson, a non-resident
plaintiff filed suit in Illinois, seeking damages under the Iowa Wrongful
Death Statute for a death which occurred in Iowa. The case was barred
under the Illinois limitations period. The Iowa Wrongful Death Statute did
not contain a limitations period; the general two-year Iowa limitations statute
had not expired. The court in Anderson refused to apply Iowa law because
it concluded that a general statute of limitations related only to a permissible
136. Id. at 260, 192 N.E.2d at 218
137. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Hart, 41 111. App. 2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 619 (2d Dist. 1963) (although
alleged injury by Oklahoma doctor to Oklahoma resident occurred in Oklahoma, Illinois
procedural law applied when suit was subsequently brought in Illinois); Horan v. New Home
Sewing Mach. Co., 289 I11. App. 340, 7 N.E.2d 401 (Ist Dist. 1937) (common law action
governed by procedural law of the forum state, Illinois, despite fact that injury occurred in
New York).
138. 368 Ill. 414, 14 N.E.2d 478 (1938).
139. Id. at 420, 14 N.E.2d at 481-82.
140. See Speight v. Miller, 437 F.2d 781, 782 n.3 (7th Cir. 1971); Bernard Food Indus., Inc.
v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969).
141. 178 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1949).
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remedy, not the substance of the rights. 42 The court's conclusion hinged on
a literal reading of the foreign statute of limitations, which did not expressly
refer to wrongful death claims. 41
Later federal cases have moved away from the narrow analysis employed
in Anderson. In O'Neal v. National Cylinder Gas Co., 44 California residents
filed a wrongful death action in Illinois, based on conduct which occurred
in Arizona. The court applied the Arizona statute of limitations, even though
the Arizona Wrongful Death Statute did not include a limitations period. A
section of the Arizona Code, separate from the Wrongful Death Statute,
provided a period of limitations for "injuries done to the person of another
where death ensued from such injuries."'' 45 Although not a part of the
Wrongful Death Statute itself, the court concluded that the Arizona provision
"qualifie[d] the right,' '1 46 and was to be applied even though the case would
have been barred under the one-year Illinois statute for wrongful death
actions. The court's conclusion was based not only on the specific language
of the statute of limitations, but also on a conclusion that the Arizona
legislative history of the statute of limitations in wrongful death actions
allowed the court to infer that the legislature intended to qualify the right. 47
O'Neal thus developed an approach that relies both on statutory language
and legislative intent, an expansion of the Anderson rationale.
The most significant decision concerning the application of foreign limi-
tations periods in Illinois is Kalmich v. Bruno, 48 a difficult case that none-
theless merits careful study. The plaintiff, now a Canadian resident, attempted
to recover damages he suffered over thirty years earlier when the defendant,
now an Illinois resident, seized and appropriated the plaintiff's business
during the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia during World War It. The plain-
tiff's action was based on rights granted by a Yugoslavian law enacted in
1946149 that provided a civil cause of action for persons whose belongings
were confiscated during the German occupation. The Yugoslavian provision
did not include a limitations period. The case would have been barred if the
five-year Illinois statute of limitations for real and personal property actions
was applied.' The plaintiff contended that the applicable statute of limi-
tations was supplied by article 134(a) of the Yugoslavian Criminal Code,
142. Id. at 310.
143. The Iowa statute involved, IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1 (West 1946), was a general two-
year limitation that had been interpreted by Iowa courts to bar a remedy, but not extinguish
a cause of action. 178 F.2d at 310.
144. 103 F. Supp. 720 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
145. Id. at 723.
146. Id. at 726. This is an application of the specificity test discussed supra note 132.
147. The Arizona statute, ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 29-202(5) (1939), referred solely and specifically
to wrongful death. The court inferred that because prior editions of the Arizona Code had
included the limitation period in the Wrongful Death Act itself, the legislature intended the
limitations period to specifically qualify the statutory right to file a wrongful death action. 103
F. Supp. at 726.
148. 404 F. Supp. 57 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 553 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1977) cert. denied,
434 U.S. 940 (1977).
149. 404 F. Supp. at 60.
150. Id. at 63.
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which was amended in 1965 to provide that there was no statute of limitations
for persons accused of confiscating property for non-military purposes during
World War II. 111 A 1953 amendment to the Yugoslavian Statute of Limita-
tions (section 20) made article 134(a) applicable to civil cases, providing that
the statute of limitations for criminal actions would serve as the statute of
limitations in civil actions if the defendants' conduct in the civil action would
subject them to criminal prosecution. 5 2
The district court explicitly employed the specificity test, as enunciated in
O'Neal, to decide whether the Yugoslavian limitations period applied. As
the court stated, "the premise underlying this .. .test is one of comity: a
court enforcing a foreign statute . . should recognize the express intention
of the foreign legislature."' 53 The court's use of the specificity test was quite
precise, and led to the conclusion that the statute of limitations of section
20 was not specifically directed to the 1946 Yugoslavian property law statute
for three reasons: (1) the property law itself contained no statute of limita-
tions; (2) the civil/criminal statue of limitations (section 20) was enacted
seven years after the property law and contained no "apparent reference"
to the property law, but applied broadly to all civil actions based on criminal
acts; and (3) the unlimited statute of limitations, which on its face was
applicable to all war crimes, was viewed by the court as a "general" statute
of limitations because it applied without differentiation to all criminal acts. 5 4
The Seventh Circuit reversed,'55 agreeing that the proper test was the
specificity approach of O'Neal rather than the literal inclusion test of Jack-
son.56 The court concluded that the provisions of Yugoslavian law, when
read together, adequately qualified the plaintiff's right. The court was not
troubled by the fact that the civil/criminal limitation was enacted before
passage of the unlimited limitation for war crimes. 5 7 The court suggested
that there was a "necessary implication" that article 134(a) would, through
section 20, automatically create an unlimited statute of limitations for civil
actions involving war crimes. 5 8 Further, the Seventh Circuit found no dif-
ficulty in meeting the specificity test even though it had read the three
separate statutory provisions together in order to ascertain the proper statute
of limitations.
Under the Kalmich approach, then, the limitations period need not be in
the same statute, nor even in existence at the time that the particular foreign
substantive right is created. Further, Kalmich does not require the particular
right to be specifically referred to in the limitations statute. In Kalmich, the
general civil/criminal reference of section 20 and the "war crimes" reference
151. Id. at 60.
152. Id. at 61.
153. Id. at 64.
154. Id.
155. Kalmich, 553 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1977).
156. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
157. 553 F.2d at 555.
158. Id.
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of article 125 together qualify the property right at stake. Although a
statutory right was at issue in Kalmich, the specificity approach may not
necessarily be limited to statutory causes of action. The rationales of O'Neal
and Kalmich suggest that if a foreign statute of limitations addresses a
particular right, even though the right is based on the common law, a court
may recognize and apply the foreign statute if it believes that is the wish of
the foreign state's legislature.
In sum, the use of a foreign statute of limitations in cases not covered
under the Borrowing Statute has been rare in Illinois state and federal courts.
The courts have left many questions unanswered under the substance/pro-
cedure approach used in those rare cases. No Illinois state court decision
has addressed the question of whether the limitations period must be con-
tained in the same provision of the statute creating the right; whether it may
be in a separate provision, but in the same statute; or whether it may be in
an entirely different statute. No opinion has considered whether a foreign
substantive limitations period may be used to bar a suit when the Borrowing
Statute does not apply due to a resident exception. Further, no opinion has
considered whether a foreign statute of limitations in a common law suit
may be substantive. The paucity of cases perhaps is caused in part by the
misapprehension of judges and attorneys that the Borrowing Statute is the
sole means by which a foreign statute of limitations may be used in an
Illinois suit. 15 9 As a result, the few parties who attempt to use a foreign
statute of limitations have little precedent to rely on for guidance.
Older Illinois cases that have selected foreign statutes of limitations to
permit suits in Illinois distinguish between substantive and procedural statutes
of limitations by restrictive statutory interpretation, a method that scholars
maintain is outmoded and too narrow. 60 This outmoded analysis is different
from the analysis used to define where a case arises under the Borrowing
Statute. The most striking distinction is the complete absence of the Second
Restatement policy analysis in cases selecting foreign statutes to permit suits
in Illinois. On the other hand, the legislative awareness test of O'Neal and
Kalmich opens the door to the Second Restatement approach that has been
seen in some of the Borrowing Statute cases. The courts may use the
legislative awareness approach as a device to choose the law of the state
which has the most significant relationship to the parties' substantive rights.
PROPOSED RESOLUTION: REPEAL OF THE BORROWING STATUTE
The few cases reported under the Borrowing Statute in recent years
demonstrate a reduced need for the statute. This is principally due to the
1973 amendment to the Tolling Statute, which sharply reduced the incidence
of tolling the Illinois limitations periods, and hence also reduced the current
need for borrowing foreign limitations periods. The creation of broad resi-
159. See, e.g., Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170, 1175 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
160. See supra note 19; see, e.g., Haefer v. Herndon, 22 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Ill. 1938);
Coffman v. Wood, 5 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Ill. 1934).
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dence exceptions also has contributed to the declining use of the Borrowing
Statute. The courts and the legislature together have accomplished an indirect
repeal of the Borrowing Statute. That action, together with the rare use of
foreign statutes of limitations outside the Borrowing Statute, suggest that
nearly all Illinois cases are subject to Illinois limitations law.
The infrequent use of the Borrowing Statute indicates that it should be
repealed. If the Borrowing Statute is rarely used there will be little oppor-
tunity to develop better judicial analysis of how it should be interpreted and
when it should be applied. The poor analyses of the cases themselves stands
for such a proposition.
There are additional reasons to conclude that Illinois would be better off
without the Borrowing Statute. As this article has demonstrated, the concept
of where a claim arises is confusing and difficult to determine. Further, the
question of where a claim arises is a remnant of the vested rights principle
in conflicts of law, a theory that Illinois courts have abandoned in other
conflicts issues. The recent cases discussed in this article demonstrate that
the courts' attempt to modernize the concept of claim accrual has been
unsuccessful. Even though few cases presently address Borrowing Statute
issues, the concept of claim accrual is unduly difficult for the court to use.
If Illinois were to repeal its Borrowing Statute, it is possible that the courts
would view the repeal as a legislative imprimatur for application of an
Illinois statute of limitations in all cases. It is also possible that the courts
would do so arbitrarily, by labeling a statute of limitations as a procedural
matter. Nevertheless, if such a scenario unfolds, the Illinois conflicts law of
limitations would not be much different from where it currently stands.
Alternatively, the courts might begin to look at each case independently and
tailor the selection of a statute of limitations to the specific factual and legal
elements of each case. In essence, the courts might engage in a deeper level
of Second Restatement analysis than has been previously applied.
Further, the repeal of the Borrowing Statute may stimulate the courts to
develop a better analysis of foreign statutes of limitations to permit a suit
that is barred under an Illinois limitations statute. This area of Illinois law
is undeveloped. O'Neal and Kalmich are significant cases and may signal
increased use of foreign statutes to permit suits barred by the Illinois statute
of limitations in Illinois federal courts.
CONCLUSION
If Illinois retains its Borrowing Statute, there remain two significant issues
for judicial determination: (1) Should the resident defendant exclusion of
Panchinsin be adopted? and (2) How should residence be defined? This
article has maintained that a defendant resident -exclusion from borrowing
is inappropriate because it will encourage forum shopping, and that Illinois
residence should be narrowly defined. This article has advocated that these
questions be answered in light of the legislative purposes underlying the
Illinois Borrowing Statute-the prevention of indefinite tolling and forum
shopping. If the Illinois Supreme Court re-discovers Hyman, and if the
1985]
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Illinois Supreme Court is true to its statement in Miller that forum shopping
concerns are relevant, then perhaps the Borrowing Statute may emerge as
an instrument of change in the law and not as an obstacle to its development.
An answer to these questions would be crucial to determine the outcome
of Kathy Keeton's claim in Illinois. 6' Assuming an unexpired Illinois statute
of limitations, the success of her claim would hinge on the court's conclusion
that borrowing an expired statute of limitations (perhaps the Ohio statute)
was precluded because either the claim arose in Illinois or the defendant
Hustler was an Illinois resident. A reader of this article is well aware that
on either point, as is typical in a conflicts case, there is enough ambiguity
in the law for the court to do exactly as it wishes.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
